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Equity Crowdfunding: All Regulated but Not Equal
Garry A. Gabison*
This Article describes how different countries have approached eq-
uity crowdfunding. It focuses on countries or regulatory authorities
that either expressed their awareness of the phenomenon but decided
to adopt a holding pattern (monitoring and investigating) or new
laws and regulations. Countries like Australia have opted to reaffirm
how their current set of regulations applies to crowdfunding whereas
others like the United States, Italy, the United Kingdom, and France
have elected to create new exemptions in an effort to facilitate equity
crowdfunding. This Article compares how each country decided to
regulate the different participants in the crowdfunding process. While
the results of these various efforts are still mostly unseen, this Article
takes an early look at the regulatory impact using one U.K. based
platform as an example of how regulations can boost investment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Crowdfunding has spread like wildfire over the last five years.1
Much of the crowdfunding phenomenon remains concentrated in the
U.S. and Europe where the large majority of crowdfunding platforms
are found.2 However, crowdfunding emerged into a world with ex-
isting regulations and confusion still reigns over how the rules should
be applied.3 This confusion may impede the development of
1. Crowdsourcing.org has 2,933 sites listed in its directory as of May 4, 2015, up from 452 in
April 2012. Directory of Sites, CROWDSOURCING.ORG, http://www.crowdsourcing.org/directory
(last visited May 4, 2015); Crowdfunding Industry Report: Market Trends, Composition and
Crowdfunding Platforms, CROWDFUNDING.ORG 2 (May 2012), available at http://www.crowdfund
ing.nl/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/92834651-Massolution-abridged-Crowd-Funding-Industry-
Reportl.pdf [hereinafter Crowdfunding Industry Report]. Massolution reports that the
crowdfunding industry has grown worldwide from $530 million in 2009 to $2.7 billion in 2012.
See Kurt Wagner, Why Crowdfunding hasn't Caught on in Asia, FORBES (July 8, 2013, 3:16 PM),
http://fortune.com/2013/07/08/why-crowdfunding-hasnt-caught-on-in-asia/. Kickstarter reported
the website helped raise $27 million in 2010 to $480 million in 2013. 2011: The Stats, KICK-
STARTER BLOG (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.kickstarter.comfblog/2011-the-stats; The Year in Kick-
starter 2013, KICKSTARTER BLOG, http://www.kickstarter.com/year/2013 (last visited June 11,
2014) [hereinafter Kickstarter 2013].
2. "[Eighty-five percent] of crowdfunding platforms are founded in the USA and Europe, and
15% in the rest of the world with Brazil (20 platforms), Canada (12) and Australia (7) ranking
among the highest." Javier Ramos, Crowdfunding and the Role of Managers in Ensuring the
Sustainability of Crowdfunding Platforms, JRC ScIErrIFIc AND POLICY REPORTS 17 (2014),
available at http://ftp.jrc.eslEURdoc/JRC85752.pdf.
3. See id. at 25.
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crowdfunding 4 and may have threatened to temper the benefits of this
new financial tool.5
While crowdfunding comes in four varieties (donation,6 reward, 7
lending,8 and equity crowdfunding), this Article focuses on equity
4. Id.
5. Crowdfunding offers an alternative method of funding for Small and Medium-Sized Enter-
prises (SME) and startups. In The Venture Crowd, Liam Collins and Yannis Pierrakis argue that
crowdfunding can not only help find the "financing gap" that SMEs experience but can also help
finance startups that present returns too low to attract venture capitalist but risk too high for
bank loans. See Liam Collins & Yannis Pierrakis, The Venture Crowd: Crowdfunding Equity
Investment into Business, NESTA 17 (July 2012), available at http://www.nesta.org.uk/sites/default/
files/theventurecrowd.pdf.
6. Contributors to donation based crowdfunding campaigns do not receive anything for their
contributions. C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws. 2012 COLUM.
Bus. L. REV. 1, 15 (2012). Donation based crowdfunding campaigns are also referred as philan-
thropic campaign when they raise for not-for-profit campaigns and sponsorship campaigns if
contributors receive publicity in exchange for their participation. See, e.g., Crowdfunding,
CROWDSOURCING.ORG, http://www.crowdsourcing.org/community/crowdfunding/7 (last visited
June 20, 2014). For instance, the Germany-based website FriendFund is a donation based plat-
form that was funded in 2010 and allow campaigners to collect money for anything from their
friends or the broader crowd. FRIENDFUND, http://www.friendfund.com/ (last visited June 20,
2014). The contributors can receive tax deduction for their participation depending on the na-
ture and the project setup. Daniel M. Satorius & Stu Polland, Crowd Funding, What Indepen-
dent Producers Should Know about the Legal Pitfalls, 28 ENT. & SPORTS L. 15, 17 (2010). In
Crowdfunding of Small Entrepreneurial Ventures, Armin Schwienbacher and Benjamin Larralde
argue that "not-for-organisations tend to be more successful in achieving their fundraising
targets as compared to for-profit organizations and project-based initiatives," possibly because
not-for-profit put more emphasis on quality and less on profit making. Armin Schwienbacher &
Benjamin Larralde, Crowdfunding of Small Entrepreneurial Ventures, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE 378 (Douglas Cumming, ed. 2012).
7. Contributors to a reward based crowdfunding campaign receive some good or service in
exchange for their contributions. For instance, the France-based website Ulule is a reward based
platform whose participants receive the rewards as described by the project owner. FAQ,
ULULE.COM, http://www.ulule.com/about/faq/#presenting-your-project (last visited June 20,
2014). Reward based crowdfunding is a form of pre-selling. As such, reward based crowdfund-
ing has not been regulated to the extent lending and equity-based campaign often have. One
project, the Polar Pen + Stylus, successfully financed in October 2014, involving magnets, raised
concerns about the product safety. Polar Pen - Modular Tool, KICKSTARTER.COM (Oct. 16,
2013), https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/1171695627/polar-pen-both-tool-and-toy-pen-stylus-
made-from-m. However, one consumer group, Consumers Union Policy & Action from Con-
sumer Reports raised this concern with the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission. Com-
ments of Consumers Union to the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission on "Safety
Standard for Magnet Sets, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking", CONSUMERSUNION (Oct. 22, 2013),
available at http://www.cpsc.gov/PageFiles/154051/MagnetsCPSCHearingCommentsOctober2Ol3
.pdf. Health Canada, the Canadian Consumer Protection agency, quashed the product for safety
reasons. Steve Mertl, Health Canada quashes Polar Pen because of Magnet Threat, Entrepreneur
out $100k, YAHOO! NEWS CANADA (Nov. 19, 2013), http://ca.news.yahoo.com/blogs/dailybrew/
health-canada-quashes-polar-pen-because-magnet-threat-211825720.html.
8. Contributors to a lending based crowdfunding campaign receive interest payments in ex-
change for financing a project. Lending based crowdfunding is a form of micro-lending, where
contributors can select a project with an associated rate of return and maturation date. Brad-
ford, supra note 6, at 19-21. For instance, the United Kingdom-based website Funding Circle is a
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crowdfunding. The Security Exchange Commission ("SEC") defines
crowdfunding as "a new and evolving method to raise money using
the Internet."9 For the purpose of this Article, equity crowdfunding is
a limited Initial Public Offering ("IPO") conducted via an internet
intermediary, often called a funding portal, and during this internet-
based IPO, companies seeking funds give campaign contributors
stakes into their ventures - in the form of shares - in exchange for
contributions.
Securities trading and IPO in particular involve a lot of risks.' 0
Thus, IPOs are heavily regulated. Faced with these new types of IPO,
some countries choose one of three positions: ignore this phenomenon
and retrofit the applicable existing regulations; reaffirm which regula-
tions apply; or create new regulations to deal with crowdfunding.
This Article looks at the last two positions. After briefly describing
the process of equity crowdfunding in Part II, this Article looks at the
European Union, a confederation of countries, and the Common-
wealth of Australia, a country in Part I1. Both entities opted to keep
and explicitly enumerate the laws and regulations that govern equity
crowdfunding. Then, Part IV of this Article looks at the United
States, Italy, the United Kingdom and France. These countries
elected to pass new regulations to offer more financial option to star-
tups and investors. Finally, Part V this Article compares these differ-
ent approaches and these different regulations. It uses the example of
CrowdCube, a U.K. based equity crowdfunding platform, to show the
impact that regulation has had on investment and investors.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF CROWDFUNDING
Crowdfunding involves three participants: the crowd (or contribu-
tors); a crowdfunding platform; and the crowdfunding campaign crea-
tor. This Part focuses on these actors investing in crowdfunding
lending based platform where people lend directly to small British businesses: the contributors
get higher returns than in traditional saving accounts and business owners get funds at lower
cost. Rates & Fees, FUNDING CIRCLE, https://www.fundingcircle.com/us/rates and-fees (last vis-
ited June 20, 2014).
9. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed Reg. 66,428 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R pts.
200, 227, 232, 239, 240 & 249).
10. Edmund W. Kitch compares investing in securities regulation to gambling and calls for
government to become consistent about its regulations by providing that if governments are fine
with citizen "gambling, does it make sense to try to prevent them from investing.., and assum-
ing the risk that their investment is an unprofitable one? Application of the securities acts needs
to adapt to modern technologies and contemporary views." Edmund W. Kitch, Crowdfunding
and an Innovator's Access to Capital, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 887, 889 (2014).
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platforms, crowdfunding campaigns, and the contributing crowd in
that order.
A. Crowdfunding Platforms
As previously discussed, four types of crowdfunding exist. Plat-
forms supporting all four types exist in Europe1 ' but equity based
crowdfunding has yet to appear in the United States. 12 Donations re-
main the predominant source of crowdfunding fundraising. 13 How-
ever, the distribution of platform types is changing14 and may change
even faster now that when new regulations facilitating equity-based
crowdfunding are in (and are coming into) play.
Questions have been raised about the usefulness of intermediary
platforms because about 75% of contributions come from the cam-
paigner's family and friends.1 5 However, using a platform serves
many purposes. First, platforms facilitate asking friends and family
11. An example of donation-based platforms is the l%Club in the Netherlands. Examples of
reward-based platforms are Verkami in Spain, Crowdculture in Sweden, ZEQUS in the United
Kingdom. Examples of lending-based platforms are LeihDeinerStadtGeld in Germany or Zopa
in the United Kingdom. Examples of equity-based platforms are Symbid in the Netherlands and
Socioinversores in Spain.
12. The U.S. has examples of donation (GoFundMe), reward (Kickstarter), and lending
(LendingClub) crowdfunding platforms. Equity crowdfunding platforms also exist in the U.S.
(e.g., EquityNet). They, however, work along a model that is more akin to angel networks.
13. Forty-nine percent of the $575 million raised in 2011 came from donations campaigns,
11% of funds came through reward-based campaigns, 22% of funds came through lending-based
campaigns, and 18% came through equity-based campaigns. Suw Charman-Anderson,
Crowdfunding Raised $1.5bn in 2011, Set To Double In 2012, FORBES (May 11, 2012, 11:20 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/suwcharmananderson/2012/05/11/crowdfunding-raised-1-5bn-in-
2011-set-to-double-in-2012/.
14. In 2011, the number of platforms supporting donation campaigns grew only by 41%, while
the number of platform supporting reward-based campaign grew by 79%. Crowdfunding Indus-
try Report, supra note 1, at 17. The number for lending-based campaigns grew by 50% and
platforms supporting equity-based campaigns grew by 114%. Id.
15. See Rene Ridtgway, Crowdfunding or Funding the Crowds: A New Model for the Distri-
bution of Wealth?, A PEER-REVIEWED JOURNAL ABOUT (2013), http://www.aprja.net/
?pageid=46. One study finds a correlation between the extent of the campaign creator's net-
work and the likelihood of reaching his/her target: "To take an average project in the Film cate-
gory, a founder with 10 Facebook friends would have a 9% chance of succeeding, one with 100
friends would have a 20% chance of success, and one with 1000 friends would have a 40%
chance of success." Ethan Mollick, The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An Exploratory Study, 29 J.
Bus. VENTURING 1, 8 (2014). Interviews conducted on behalf of JRC-IPTS confirm these find-
ings. See generally Anne Green et al., CrowdEmploy Crowdsourcing Case Studies: An Empirical
Investigation into the Impact of Crowdsourcing on Employability, JRC TECHNICAL REPORTS 49
(2013), available at http://ftp.jrc.es/EURdoc/JRC85751.pdf. Kickstarter published that of its 2.2
million people who backed projects in 2012, only 570,672 backed two or more. The Best of 2012
- Repeat Backers, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/year/2012#repeat-backers (last
visited June 14, 2012) [hereinafter Best of 2012]. In 2013, Kickstart had 3 million people pledge,
of which "807,733 backed more than one project." Kickstarter 2013, supra note 1. Hence about
74% of backers back only one project in 2012 and 71% in 2013. Id.
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for money because they remove some of the stigma associated with
these requests. 16
Second, the use of a platform sends a signal. Platforms lend legiti-
macy to the projects because these platforms check a campaigner's
information and projects, and they have various other anti-fraud
procedures.17
Third, public platforms reassure contributors because they allow
them to observe how many other individuals believe in the project (as
well as the identity of these individuals 18). Platforms also play a role
in preventing fraud or investment in projects bound to fail. Most plat-
forms use the all-or-nothing model,19 which requires a critical mass to
believe in the project before it is funded.20 They only divest the funds
collected to the campaign creator only if the target is reached.2 '
16. See Green et al., supra note 15, at 43 (finding that one interviewee "suggested that for
some smaller projects 'it might be a nicer way to ask friends and family to support you."').
17. See Ramos, supra note 2, at 20, 46. Blakley C. Davis and Justin W. Webb argue that the
"relationships with underwriters and/or strategic alliances with established firms can also reduce
the liabilities stemming from newness by enabling the venture to essentially borrow legitimacy
from the external party." Blakley C. Davis & Justin W. Webb, Crowd-Funding of En-
trepreneurial Ventures: Getting the Right Combination of Signals, 32 FRONTIERS OF ENTREPRE-
NEURSHIP RESEARCH 1, 5 (2012).
18. If potential contributors can see who donates and see that individuals who know the cam-
paign creator are contributing as well, they may be further encouraged to participate.
19. All-or-nothing means "that the project must be fully funded and reach its fundraising
goals within a specified timeframe in order for any money to change hands." Lisa T. Alexander,
Cyberfinancing for Economic Justice, 4 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REV. 309, 354 (2013).
20. This model assures that a critical mass of contributors believes in the project and the
project passed the "wisdom of the crowd" sniff test. "[T]he 'wisdom of the crowd' argument
states that a crowd can at times be more efficient than individuals or teams in solving corporate
problems. Hence crowdfunders as a crowd would be more efficient than a few equity investors
alone." Schwienbacher & Larralde, supra note 6, at 380. In other words, while one person may
be mistaken, the crowd will, on average, be correct.
21. Ricardo Martfnez-Cafias, Pablo Ruiz-Palomino, & Radil del Pozo-Rubio, Crowdfunding
And Social Networks In The Music Industry: Implications For Entrepreneurship, 11 INT'L Bus. &
ECON. RES. J. 1471, 1472 (2012). See also Mollick, supra note 15, at 6, for a discussion regarding
how Kickstarter puts in place checks to avoid individual self-funding the difference between the
fund raised and the funds needed to trigger the divestment of the funds. Some donation-based
crowdfunding platforms also use a keep-it-all model, where the platform divest the funds col-
lected regardless of whether the target has been reached. See, e.g., Fees & Pricing, INDIEOOGO,
https://support.indiegogo.com/hc/en-us/articles/204456408-Fees-Pricing (last visited June 24,
2014). For instance, Indiegogo affords either a fixed funding (all-or-nothing) or (keep-it-all) and
demands 4% fee for the former and 9% for the latter. Id. One platform follows the bounty
model (Bountysource), where this platform divests the funds raised to the individual from the
crowd who completes the open-source software project posted by the campaign creator; the
contributors get a copy of the software as well. Frequently Asked Questions, GITHUB (Feb. 18,
2015), https://github.comlbountysource/frontend/wikilFrequently-Asked-Questions.
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Finally, platforms give creators a place to publicize their projects,22
and allow them to send signals about the quality of their project, 23 to
receive feedback,24 and to reach a broader network.2 5 Platforms col-
lect a fee for their services.26
Many platforms offer different kind of services under the heading
equity crowdfunding. They usually cover facilitating the sale of direct
equity,27 offering securities in an intermediate vehicle (usually a hold-
ing company), 28 and offering profit-sharing contracts.29 While these
22. Mollick, supra note 15, tested whether featuring on the platform's homepage impacted the
likelihood of success and found that being featured has a positive and statistically significant
effect on the likelihood of success. Id. at 9. "Advertising and generating publicity were seen as
important resources provided by the platform." Green et al., supra note 15, at 47. However, the
interviewees affirmed that most of the campaign creators were the one doing their own advertis-
ing; platforms gave them a place to direct interested people. "An unsuccessful campaign does
not necessarily mean negative publicity if the exercise is managed well and in a way that high-
lights the entrepreneurship involved in putting together a project and that fundraisers have con-
sidered the risks." Id. at 54.
23. See, e.g., Mollick, supra note 15, at 8 (providing campaign organizers can signal about the
quality of their project by including a video and answering questions, which both influence the
success of the campaign). See generally Davis & Webb, supra note 17 (discussing the effective-
ness of the various mechanisms through which entrepreneurs signal the quality of their ventures
to attract investment). See Paul Belleflamme, Thomas Lambert & Armin Schwienbacher,
Crowdfunding: Tapping the Right Crowd, 29 J. Bus. VENTURING 600 (2013), for a discussion on
how sending the appropriate signal about the product quality will help the campaign as well.
24. "Most people use crowdfunding for raising money (90%), or to get public attention (85%)
and obtain feedback for their product and services (60%)." Ramos, supra note 1, at 20 (internal
quotations omitted).
25. Best of 2012, supra note 15, suggests 25% of contributors on Kickstarter back multiple
projects and hence constitute a network of backers. "Success depends on word of mouth and
relies on patrons to make that happen. Patrons are expected to publicise and recommend the
project via email, Facebook, Twitter, etc." Ramos, supra note 1, at 37 (internal quotations
omitted).
26. Some platforms charge a percentage of the amount raised, while others charge a flat fee.
For instance, "[i]f a project reaches its funding target," PleasedFund.us charges "a flat fee of five
per cent of the money raised." Green et al., supra note 15, at 39. Whereas RateSetter charges
borrowers a "£115 flat fee for a three-year loan; £5 monthly charge in the rolling market."
Emma Simon, Peer-to-Peer Lenders: Zopa's Rivals Compared, THE TELEGRAPH (Mar. 9, 2014,
6:30 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/savings/8369316/Peer-to-peer-
lenders-Zopas-rivals-compared.html.
27. For instance, EquityNet is a crowdfunding platform that operates as an intermediary:
"How do investment transactions happen? EquityNet does not handle transactions. When an
investor wants to invest in an EquityNet company, they will message the entrepreneur and
schedule a time to discuss the investment. The investment will happen outside of EquityNet."
Frequently Asked Questions, EQuiTYNET, https://www.equitynet.com/faqs.aspx (last visited Sept.
8, 2014).
28. Seedrs in the U.K., Symbid in the Netherlands, and MyMicrolnvest in Belgium offer such
intermediary services. For instance, Symbid, a major equity-based crowdfunding platform, or-
ganizes the investors of a successful crowdfunding investment round into a single purpose vehi-
cle (which it calls an 'Investor Cooperative'). The investor syndicate will be heard as a group
and stand behind one powerful vote representing the entire amount of the equity offered in the
fundraising campaign; in other words, the whole investor syndicate gets one vote. This ensures
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services are valuable, the discussion of equity crowdfunding in this Ar-
ticle refers to the traditional emission of direct equity shares (common
shares) with or without voting rights.
B. Crowdfunding Campaigns and Fund Seekers
The campaign creators must strategize about their crowdfunding
campaign. The strategy can be divided into three phases: before, dur-
ing, and after the campaign.
Before the campaign, the campaigner must decide how much to
raise money through the equity-based campaign and select the appro-
priate thresholds. The thresholds can be the keystone to a campaign:
if a campaigner asks for too little, his company may lack the funds it
needs later; if a campaigner asks for too much, the campaign may fail
to reach the threshold. 30 A campaigner must also select the duration
of the campaign 3' and select a share scheme (i.e. types of shares emit-
ted, the price of the shares, and the level of capitalization). 32 A cam-
paigner must decide whether the project can be overfunded 33 and be
wary of giving away too much of the company's own capitalization. 34
that the investors' voices are heard, but it also keeps the business attractive to future rounds of
financing, which is the key to investors' ultimate goal of liquidity. Gregory D. Deschler, Wisdom
of the Intermediary Crowd: What the Proposed Rules Mean for Ambitious Crowdufnding In-
termediaries, 58 ST. Louis L.J. 1145, 1186-87 (2014).
29. Companisto and Seedmatch in Germany follow a subordinated debt model. Since 2012,
Seedmatch offers subordinated loans, which are debt instruments that eventually expire, which
results in a Bonus Interest. See FAQ, SEEDMATCH, https://www.seedmatch.de/faq (last visited
Sept. 15, 2014).
30. Ramos, supra note 2, at 22. An analysis of projects in Role Playing Game sector con-
cludes that successful projects "not only raised 679% more than the unsuccessful projects
($8251.31 for $1058.88) but also raised 230% more than the initial goal, (i.e. projects aiming to
raise smaller amounts of money were more successful in reaching their threshold)." Id.
31. Mollick, supra note 15, at 2 (finding that the length of the fundraising period has a statisti-
cally significant negative impact upon the likelihood of success of a reaching the threshold). A
long period may send a negative signal with regard to the campaigner's confidence in reaching
the threshold. Id. at 8. A short period may not allow enough time to reach the threshold. See
id. at 13.
32. "[O]ne of the first stages in the crowdfunding process requires setting a valuation for the
company so the entrepreneurs can decide how much equity to offer for the amount of capital
they are seeking to raise." Collins & Pierrakis, supra note 5, at 23. See id. for a discussion
regarding the challenges of pricing shares accurately and how some platforms opt for a "market-
driven approach to setting valuation."
33. Mollick, supra note 15, at 13. Overfunding has a number of drawbacks including delays
herding of funds discussed infra and specifically over-funded projects tend to have more delayed
delivery of rewards for rewards of reward-based crowdfunding. Id. at 13.
34. For instance, CrowdCube specifies that the campaign designer has "the option [to]
'overfund' . . . where entrepreneurs can raise more money for their business in exchange for
releasing more equity." FAQs: What is Overfunding, CROWDCUBE, http://www.crowdcube.com/
pg/crowdcube-faq-20 (last visited June 24, 2014). If a project is overfunded, the extra capitalisa-
tion is drawn from the campaigner's shares because the number of total shares cannot legally
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The campaign creator must also select the platform.35 This choice
endogenously affects other decisions all of which can impact the suc-
cess of the campaign. 36 The campaigner must finalize the design the
campaign material, 37 which involves a delicate balance about the
amount of information to disclose.38
During the campaign, the fundraiser must keep working to reach his
goal. Even though "[a]dvertising and generating publicity were seen
as important resources provided by the platform," the fundraiser must
further advertise the campaign. 39 The fundraiser must reach out to his
or her friends, family, and other social networks because relying solely
on the platform's network may not attract enough interest.40 The fun-
draiser must be active in publicizing his project 4 and must also answer
questions from the crowd:42 in fact his or her continuous involvement
impacts whether a campaign succeeds.43
After the campaign, the fundraiser must continue to be responsive
to the company's investors and even reach out to them. "In seeking
opportunities, investors may be looking for a business in which to in-
vest without being directly involved, or they may be looking for a bus-
iness in which they can participate more actively. '44 The fundraiser
can also benefit from investor participating because, unlike a tradi-
tional IPO, campaigners know the identity of their investors and they
change without reviewing the business charter and without trigger some dilution of capital. See
FA Qs, SEEDRS, http:/Iearn.seedrs.com/faqs/4what-is-overfunding-of-campaigns (last visited June
24, 2014).
35. Platforms usually have varying models. For instance, some platforms allow for "upward
flexibility" and allow an increase in the number of equity offered. See, e.g., SEEDRS, supra note
34.
36. See Ajay Agrawal, Christian Catalini & Avi Goldfarb, Some Simple Economics of
Crowdfunding, 14 INNOVATION POL'Y ECON. 63 (2014), for a discussion detailing how different
reward-based campaign decisions impact the success of campaigns.
37. See generally Mollick, supra note 15, for a discussion regarding the impact and the signal
sent by a well-designed campaign.
38. Equity campaigners may face some information asymmetry issues with potential investors
(the crowd, banks, or venture capitalist) because they understand the value of their project bet-
ter than outsiders. To overcome these issues, they must disclose enough information to obtain
funds from the crowd, they but may fear that disclosing too much information can detrimentally
impact the value of their project. A public forum like a crowdfunding website may deter fund
seekers because these kinds of forums do not lend themselves to non-disclosure agreements.
39. Green et al., supra note 15, at 47.
40. See id. at 48-49.
41. Id
42. Id. at 50.
43. See Mollick, supra note 15, at 8.
44. Green et al., supra note 15, at 64.
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may contact investors willing to share their experience and
expertise.4 5
After the campaign, the funds raised may remain insufficient for the
fund seeker to complete his project. 46 However, a successful cam-
paigner may use the campaign as a signal of the interest - similar to a
market study - when presenting projects to seek further funds from
traditional financiers like banks or venture capitalists. 47
All these choices can overwhelm entrepreneurs and deter others.48
However, platforms have a strong incentive to help fund seekers navi-
gate through this maze and succeed. The next section looks at the last
participant in crowdfunding campaign, the investors to get a full un-
derstanding of the issues involved.
C. The Investing Crowd: Thread with Care
The crowd or investors participate in equity crowdfunding because
they gain access to new investment opportunities, they can feel part of
a bigger community, and they can network with other co-investors. 49
Investors may also participate because they can invest in not-for-profit
projects and the equity invested may be written off as philanthropic
donations. 50 While contributors can invest because of non-financial
reasons, the majority expect to break even. 51
45. Schwienbacher & Larralde, supra note 6, at 17 (providing a case study on Media No Mad
(Benoot.com) and finding that "[i]n the case, investors had very diverse skills, all more or less
related to the project. Therefore, letting investors have their say has to be considered as an asset
rather than a liability.").
46. Ethan Mollick & Venkat Kuppuswamy, After the Campaign: Outcomes of Crowdfunding
12 (Working Paper, Jan. 9, 2014) (finding that over 20% of successful crowdfunding campaigns
were followed by fundraising from outside sources - from a sample of 230 Kickstarter projects),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract-id=2376997. For instance, Oculus
VR raised $250,000 through Kickstarter in 2012, than obtained $90 million from venture capital-
ists by 2014, and is about to be acquired by Facebook for $2 billion. Victor Luckerson, When
Crowdfunding Goes Corporate: Kickstarter Backers Vent Over Facebook's Oculus Buy, TIME
(Mar. 26, 2014), http://time.com/39271/oculus-facebook-kickstarter-backlash/.
47. The fundraiser can use the success of his or her crowdfunding campaign as a market study
and demand estimation when he or she attempts to obtain a traditional form of financing. See
Agrawal et al., supra note 36, at 76. Pebble, which started as a reward based crowdfunding
campaign ($10 million raised), used the crowdfunding success to obtain traditional loans ($15
million raised). Id. at 63-64, 68.
48. See Green et al., supra note 15, at 39-73, for a complete understanding of the choices
involved before and during the campaign.
49. See, e.g., Agrawal et al., supra note 36, 73-74; Schwienbacher & Larralde, supra note 6, at
18.
50. Daniel M. Satorius & Stu Pollard, Crowd Funding: What Independent Producers Should
Know About the Legal Pitfalls, 28 ENT. & SPORTS L. 15 (2010) (providing that crowdfunding
campaigns may be set up as not-for-profits and grant contributors some tax reliefs).
51. "For most of [investors in Media No Mad], the concept of investing in a company in order
to make a later profit by reselling the shares was not the most important reason for investing.
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Fraud, incompetence, and lack of exit strategies jeopardize equity
crowdfunding. Fraud constitutes the biggest threat to crowdfunding52
because traditional reputational and legal enforcement methods may
not work. First, fear of getting a bad reputation may not be sufficient
incentive: traditional anti-fraud methods like negative reputation or
goodwill may fail for crowdfunding because the Internet provides ano-
nymity and because fund seekers do not repeatedly fundraise. 53
Second, legal enforcement may also fail because each individual in-
vestor, who makes small investments, does not have enough individual
incentive to sue for fraud or breach of contract.54 Fraud, however,
remains rare. 55
Investors are also exposed to entrepreneurs who may be incompe-
tent or may have miss-calibrated their projects; but this also seems
rare.56 Hence, crowdfunding may not attract only lemons but instead
may attract investments that professional investors do not fancy. 57 In-
Indeed, when asked if they were expecting to make high profits from the deal, 78% answer that
they are not planning to earn from it neither do they want to make a loss." Schwienbacher &
Larralde, supra note 6, at 16.
52. See Crowdfunding Proposed Rules, Securities Act Release No. 9470, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 70741, 78 Fed. Re. 66,427 (proposed Oct. 23, 2013) [hereinafter SEC Rule Interpreta-
tion]; see also Collins & Pierrakis, supra note 5, at 24; Ramos, supra note 1, at 23.
53. Ross S. Weinstein, Crowdfunding in the U.S. and Abroad: What to Expect When You're
Expecting, 46 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 427, 436-37 (2013). While fund seekers may not be repeat
players, platforms are. To succeed, these platforms have incentive to avoid a reputation as a bad
market place, to avoid attracting fraudulent schemes and to perform a due diligence for each
project and continue to do so throughout the campaign. For instance, Kickstarter cancelled a
crowdfunding campaign that showed potential signs of fraud during the campaign, after 80% of
the threshold was already reached. Anton Root, Kickstarter Pulls Plug on the Rock Smartwatch
after Backer Concerns, CROWDSOURCING.ORG (Dec. 11, 2013, 10:31 PM), http://www.crowdsourc
ing.org/editorial/kickstarter-pulls-plug-on-the-rock-smartwatch-after-backer-concerns/29644.
Platforms may associate with banks that have experience evaluating fraudulent projects. For
instance, Symbid, a Dutch equity-based crowdfunding platform, "has an EU banking licence,
through its finance partner Intersoft." Ramos, supra note 2, at 30. This association gives the
platform access to the experience of evaluating projects. Platforms can also stagger the fund
release to limit the size of the funds affected. See Collins & Pierrakis, supra note 5, at 24. For
instance, some experts recommend the use of escrow account and other disclosure requirements
involving disclosing a detailed business plan and ownership. David R6thler & Karsten Wenzlaff,
Crowdfunding Schemes in Europe, EUROPEAN EXPERT NETWORK ON CULTURE (EENC) 23
(Sept. 2011). See Ramos, supra note 1, at 46, for a discussion of the role that platform managers
can play to prevent fraud.
54. Crowdfunding relies on small investments from many investors instead of large invest-
ment from a few investors. These small amounts may not provide each individual investor with
enough incentive to sue to enforce their rights.
55. In a sample of 381 Kickstarter products, 3 issued refunds and 11 stopped responding to
backers: 3.6% of the projects were incomplete. Mollick, supra note 15, at 11.
56. Id. Mollick does not distinguish between fraudulent project and incompetent entrepre-
neurs, but the risks remain minimal when looking at reward-based crowdfunding projects. Id.
57. A study found that 15.8% of reward crowdfunding campaigners sought prior funds from
family and friends and 14.6% sought prior funds from external companies. See Ethan Mollick &
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vestors may be willing to invest despite fraud or incompetence risks
because they invest small amounts and can diversify their
investment.58
Finally, some investors (e.g., venture capitalist funds) need an exit
strategy before investing because they prefer to profit by selling their
investments instead of waiting for dividends to arrive.5 9 Hence, they
must either sell their shares back to the entrepreneur or to other in-
vestors.60 In either case, an investor may struggle to know whether
the valuation is correct 61 without traditional market mechanisms. 62
The slow development of a secondary market63 also slows the develop-
ment of the primary market;64 hence, crowdfunding may undesirably
lock in investors.
Crowdfunding has large upsides but it also has some downsides.
The following Parts discuss how policymakers in various countries and
federations decided to mitigate some of these downsides without neg-
atively affecting the upsides.
III. GOVERNMENTS ARE PAYING ATTENTION TO CROWDFUNDING
This Part discusses two different types of entities: a country (Austra-
lia) and a confederation of countries (the European Union). Austra-
lia's regulating agency published a guidance (akin to a press release)
about equity crowdfunding in 2012. Similarly, the European Commis-
sion released a public communication touching upon some of the
same points in 2014. These two entities exemplify the intricacies of
Venkat Kuppuswamy, When Firms are Potemkin Villages: Entrepreneurs and Formal Organiza-
tion, Table 1 (Working Paper, Jan. 25, 2014). This suggests, amongst other things, that reward-
based crowdfunding can complement other form of traditional financing.
58. Rational economic theory should dictate that investors implicitly add these risks to their
valuation of any project.
59. ANDREW METRICK & AYAKO YASUDA, VENTURE CAPITAL & THE FINANCE OF INNOVA.
TION (2d ed. 2011) (discussing the necessity of an exit strategy for venture capitalist to invest and
multiply their investment).
60. Ahlers et al., infra note 102, at 3 (a study of 104 equity crowdfunding projects in Australia
finding "that start-ups that signal their intention to seek an exit by either IPO or a trade sale are
more likely to attract investors than those planning to use other forms of exit.").
61. See SEC Rule Interpretation, supra note 52, at 66,457.
62. A wide literature discusses how venture capitalists evaluate startups. See, e.g., Tarek
Miloud, Arild Aspelund, & Mathieu Cabrol, Startup Valuation by Venture Capitalists: An Empir-
ical Study, 14 VENTURE CAPITAL 151-174 (2012); Joern H. Block, Geertjan De Vries, Jan H.
Schumann & Philipp Sandner, Trademarks and Venture Capital Valuation, 29 J. Bus. VENTUR-
ING 525-542 (2014).
63. See, e.g., Agrawal et al., supra note 36, at 76, 78.
64. See, e.g., Collins et al., supra note 5, at 30; SEC Rule Interpretation, supra note 52, at
66,459.
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implementing an equity crowdfunding campaign in the current regula-
tory climate.
Equity crowdfunding involve three actors: the crowdfunding plat-
forms, the fundraising companies, and the investing crowd. Numerous
regulations already exist and affect these actors. Individual subsec-
tions address each regulated actor.
A. New Regulations Are Not Necessary But Clarifications May Be:
The Case of Australia from 2012 to 2014
This section investigates crowdfunding in Australia. In 2012, Aus-
tralia decided to clarify the applicable regulations but did not add any
new exemption to accommodate equity crowdfunding. Instead, Aus-
tralia issued "guidance" on crowdfunding. 65
In this guidance, the Australian Securities and Investment Commis-
sion ("ASIC") affirmed that crowdfunding that "involve[s] offering or
advertising a financial product, providing a financial service or fun-
draising through securities requiring a complying disclosure docu-
ment" 66 are regulated activities under the Corporations Act of 200167
and the ASIC Act.68
The ASIC Guidance articulates how platforms, companies, and in-
vestors are regulated. Crowdfunding platforms must obtain "Austra-
lian financial services licence[s]" which are granted by ASIC.69 As
part of its obligations, the holder of a license must ensure that the
financial services are provided "efficiently, honestly and fairly"70 to
promote consumer confidence while reducing risks and fraud.7 ' Hold-
ing intermediaries - like platforms and their agents - accountable
helps perpetuate these goals.72 Promoting offerings, including having
a public webpage (because they constitute "publications"), is gov-
65. Australian Securities & Investments Commission, ASIC Guidance on Crowd Funding, 12-
196MR, 14 August 2012, available at http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/media-centre/find-a-media-re-
lease/2012-releases/12-196mr-asic-guidance-on-crowd-funding/ [hereinafter ASIC Guidance].
66. Id.
67. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 761G (Austi.).
68. Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 12BC.
69. ASIC Guidance, supra note 65; see also Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) pt 7.6, ss 910A -
917F.
70. Id. s 912A(1)(a).
71. Gail Pearson, Risk and the Consumer in Australian Financial Services Reform, 28 SYDNEY
L. REV. 99, 117 (2006).
72. If they failed to fulfill their obligations, they may lose their license. See Corporations Act
2001 (Cth) ss 914A - 915J. Acting without a license involves fines and/or imprisonment. ASIC
Guidance, supra note 65.
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erned by the ASIC Class Order 02/273 on Business Introduction or
Matching Services. 73
Intermediaries like platforms may not have to comply with the li-
censing requirements if they take advantage of an exemption for of-
ferings and to the licensing requirement. For example, platforms
dealing with offering of not more than AUS $5 million ($4.5 million) 74
for any one business are exempt of the licensing requirement. 75 This
exemption also requires that the intermediary does not have stakes in
the company conducting the offering and that the publication contains
information about the issuer (and the intermediary), the risks, and
"statements appropriate for the particular medium. '76 Platforms must
be wary of these licensing requirements but may find ways to avoid
them.
Companies fundraising through equity shares usually need to pro-
duce disclosure documents - which generally take the form of a pro-
spectus - under the Product Disclosure Statement. 77 The Product
Disclosure Statement requires that disclosure documents be timely,
relevant and complete, promote product understanding, product com-
parison, highlight important information, and have regards to consum-
ers' needs.78 In other words, the prospectus must contain information
about the issuer of the equity shares, the rights and benefits accompa-
nying these shares, the circumstance/time those rights and benefits oc-
cur, the risks associated with these shares, the costs, the return, the
commission, taxation implications, dispute resolution system, and, in
general, any other information that might influence an investor's deci-
sion to acquire the shares - including audited financial statements
lodged with ASIC.79
73. ASIC Class Order 02/273 (Business Introduction or Matching Services) (May 3, 2002),
available at http://www.australiansecurities.net/docs/co02-273.pdf [hereinafter ASIC Class Order
02/273].
74. Converting this value and other values in Australian Dollars in the rest of this paper using
the Federal Reserve Board exchange rate data on December 31, 2013 ($0.8929 to AU $1).
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Historical Rates for the Australian Dollar,
FEDERALRESERVE.GOV, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/hl0/hist/dat00_al.htm (last vis-
ited Aug. 18, 2014).
75. ASIC Class Order 02/273, supra note 73, at First Exemption s 3(h).
76. Id. First Exemption s 3(b). The guidance also envisages that platforms perform the func-
tion of managing the investment scheme (such as venture capitalist funds) or providing financial
advice services. ASIC Guidance, supra note 65. These roles are discussed in more details when
looking at the European Directives infra - but platforms usually do not perform these functions.
77. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 706 - 707; ASIC Guidance, supra note 65.
78. Australian Securities and Investment Commission, Regulatory Guide 168: Disclosure:
Product Disclosure Statements (and other disclosure obligations), 17-25 (Oct. 2011), available at
http://download.asic.gov.au/media/1240931/rg168-published-28-october-2011.pdf.
79. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ch 7, pt 7.9, div 2, sub-div C, ss 1013C - 1013H.
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The company seeking funds must produce one of the following
three documents: the required prospectus, 80 offer information state-
ment,81 and profile statement.82 First, filing the required prospectus
involves a comprehensive and standard full disclosure documentation,
which contains enough information, including audited statements, etc.,
for investors to be able to make an educated investment.83 Second, an
offer information statement is an alternative to the prospectus re-
quirement. It has lower disclosure requirements but requires an at-
most six-month-old audited financial report.84 This statement can be
used to raise AUS $10 million ($8.9 million) 85 that can be aggregated
over multiple fundraising events.86 Finally, a profile statement would
be much shorter, 87 but ASIC currently does not have an approved use
for a profile statement. 88 A prospectus or even an offer information
statement can be quite expensive because they involve audited
documents.
To avoid these expensive disclosure requirements and having to file
with ASIC, fundraising companies can take advantage of an exemp-
80. The Corporations Act section 705 explains the three different documents. For prospectus:
"[t]he standard full-disclosure document"; or short form prospectus: "[m]ay be used for any
offer. Section 712 allows a prospectus to refer to material lodged with ASIC instead of setting it
out. Investors are entitled to a copy of this material if they ask for it." Id.
81. Id. (offer information statement: "Section 709 allows an offer information statement to be
used instead of a prospectus for an offer to issue securities if the amount raised from issues of
securities is $10 million or less.").
82. Id. (profile statement: "Section 721 allows a brief profile statement (rather than the pro-
spectus) to be sent out with offers with ASIC approval. The prospectus must still be prepared
and lodged with ASIC. Investors are entitled to a copy of the prospectus if they ask for it.").
83. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 710. Regulatory Guide 56 (also known as Policy Statement
56) provides regulatory guidelines to fulfil the required information based upon the Corporation
Law. ASIC, Regulatory Guide 168: Disclosure: Product Disclosure Statements (and other dis-
closure obligations), 17-25 (Oct. 2011), available at http://download.asic.gov.au/media/1239002/
rg56.pdf. See, e.g., Joanna Khoo, Civil Liability for Misstatements in Offer Documents: Striking
the Right Balance, 6 BYU IN-r'L L. & MGMT. R. 49 (2010) (comparing the disclosure requirement
in the U.S., U.K., New Zealand and Australia as well as the civil liability for misstatements).
84. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 712. S. M. Solaiman, Statutory Civil Liabilities of Corporate
Gatekeepers for Defective Prospectuses in Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom and
Canada: A Comparison, 35 COMPANY LAWYER 100 (2014), available at http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=2293&context=lhapapers.
85. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 705.
86. Id. s 709(4).
87. See id. s 714.
88. "A profile statement is a document setting out limited key information about the company
and the offer. Companies can only use profile statements where ASIC has approved their use.
There are currently no approved uses for profile statements." ASIC, Fundraising: What Disclo-
sure Documents Do You Need to Give Potential Investors when Raising Funds? (Mar. 13, 2015,
4:57 AM), http://www.asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/fundraising/what-disclosure-documents-
do-you-need-to-give-potential-investors-when-raising-funds/#profile.
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tion.89 The most notable exemption requires that the securities offer-
ing involves less than twenty non-qualified investors and less than
AUS $2 million ($1.79 million) valuation within the last twelve
months. 90 Companies may still fundraise from qualified investors
without limits. 91
Investors are divided in two categories: qualified and non-qualified
investors. Qualified investors are sophisticated, professional, or high
net worth investors. 92 Sophisticated investors are investors who have
previous experience in investing, understand the merits, risks, value,
and terms of the offer.93 These investors must be able to assess ade-
quacy of the information they receive and sign a written statement
acknowledging these aforementioned elements. 94 Professional inves-
tors95 include individuals who hold licenses themselves. 96 High net-
worth investors have gross assets of at least AUS $10 million ($8.9
million) .97
Qualified investors can invest as they see fit. In this exemption,
companies can only raise funds from twenty non-qualified investors.
This exemption offers a small window for crowd investors to invest in
new (and old) ventures. This qualified/non-qualified dichotomy ap-
pears in a number of regulations.
The guidance offered by ASIC has served as a warning for equity
crowdfunding platforms as well as companies intending to fundraise.
It has reminded participants of the applicable regulations as well as
the limitations to what platforms and companies may do. These regu-
lations have not, however, prevented the development of equity
crowdfunding involving the common citizen but previous crowdfund-
ing efforts have not harnessed the potential of crowds.
For instance, since 2005, the Australian Small Scale Offering Board
("ASSOB") has been successfully combined the Corporations Act ex-
89. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 708. See Matt Vitins, Crowdfunding and Securities Laws:
What the Americans Are Doing and the Case for an Australian Crowdfunding Exemption, 22 J.L.
INFO. & Sci. 92, 123-27 (2012) for a more in-depth discussion regarding this exemption.
90. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 708(2).
91. Id. s 708(8).
92. See id. s 708(8) - (11).
93. Id. s 708(10). Sophisticated investors also include individuals that invest AUS $500,000
($0.45 million) in the securities in one instance or cumulatively. Id. s 708(8).
94. Id. s 708(10).
95. "An offer of securities does not need disclosure to investors under this Part if it is made to
a .. .professional investor." Id. s 708(11)(a) (emphasis in original).
96. Id. s 9 ("professional investor, subsection (a)).
97. "An offer of securities does not need disclosure to investors under this Part if it is made to:
... a person who has or 'controls [gross assets] of at least $10 million."' Id. s 708(11)(b). If
investors solely have control over the $10 million, they will also fall under the definition of
professional investors. Id. s 9 ("professional investor," subsection (e)).
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emption described above with the ASIC Class Order 02/273.98 They
offer to help raise up to AUS $5 million per projects and have helped
raised over AUS $140 million (about $125 million). 99 ASSOB also
creates a secondary market for shares. o00
Because of the twenty non-qualified investor constraint,10 ' AS-
SOB's success has triggered some interest and it has been the subject
of a study on signaling. 0 2 Ahlers, Cumming, Gunther, and Schweizer
study 104 equity crowdfunding projects in Australia. They find "that
startups that signal their intention to seek an exit by either IPO or a
trade sale are more likely to attract investors than those planning to
use other forms of exit.' 03 This finding shows the importance of an
exit strategy. They conclude that the "crowdfunding market operates
in a largely rational manner, even among retail investors who are ar-
guably less sophisticated."'' 0 4
In 2014, the Corporations and Market Advisory Committee, an ad-
visor board for the Australian Department of Treasury, released a re-
port on equity crowdfunding. l05 In this report, the committee suggests
a set of rules to facilitate Australian equity crowdfunding and their
possible implementation. 0 6 The proposed rules have not yet been
voted upon but they may have been prompted by examples set by
other countries. 0 7
98. See Australian Small Scale Offering Board, About ASSOB, ASSOB, http://
www.assob.com.au/about.asp?page=1 (last visited May 14, 2015).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. "[Tlhe average amount of capital raised in a successful ASSOB offering is around half a
million dollars." Vitins, supra note 89, at 110-11.
102. Gerrit K.C. Ahlers, Douglas Cumming, Christina Gfinther & Denis Schweizer, Signaling
in Equity Crowdfunding (Working Paper Oct. 2013), available at http://funginsti-
tute.berkeley.edu/sites/defaultfiles/
Guenther% 20AbstractEquity% 20Crowd% 20Financing.pdf.
103. Id. at 3.
104. Id. at 30.
105. Corporations and Market Advisory Committee, Crowd Sourced Equity Funding, Aus-
TRALIAN GOVERNMENT (May 2014), available at http://www.camac.gov.au/camac/camac.nsf/
byheadline/pdffinal®eports+2014/$file/csefreport_21may2014.doc.
106. They recommend that platforms must be used, be licensed, and they must encourage
disclosure and control communication, id. at 87; fund seeker cannot aggregately raise more than
AUS $2 million per 12-month period, id. at 59-60; and investors can invest up to AUS $2,500 per
companies and AUS $10,000 total in a 12-month period, id. at 144-47.
107. The report compares Australia to other countries that have such regulations already in
place.
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B. Equity Crowdfunding Involves Multi-layered Regulations: the
Example of the European Union Directives and
Regulations
This section focuses on the European Union Directives and Regula-
tions. The European Union is a confederation of countries. It has an
intertwined set of governing bodies (the European Commission, Eu-
ropean Council, and the European Parliament) that passes Directives
and Regulations. EU Directives are not laws and have no power:
each EU Member State must implement these Directives by passing
its own regulations; when writing new regulations, each Member State
use these Directives as regulatory floors or ceilings depending on the
phrasing. Member States must implement the Regulations as written.
In other words, while these Member States can implement these Di-
rectives differently, Regulations are the same across Member States.
This section discusses the Directives that the European Commission
("EC") identifies in a Communication as having potential impact on
equity crowdfunding. 108
Depending on the way a crowdfunding platform sets up its opera-
tion, it may fall under one or several of the following Directives.
What a platform does impacts how platforms are regulated: emitting
shares, holding funds, and providing financial advice are the three
main regulated actions. These actions trigger different Directives and
different requirements. The follow discussion explains which actions
trigger what Directives.
First, crowdfunding platforms may emit and sell shares to the public.
If these platforms emit and sell shares, they fall under the type of ac-
tivities regulated by the Directive on Markets in Financial Instru-
ments.109 This Directive aims to harmonize financial markets across
the European Union and to create a single market in financial ser-
vices. In general terms, it establishes minimum rules under which in-
vestment firms operate,110 and more specifically, it governs any firm
108. See Unleashing the potential of Crowdfunding in the European Union, at Communication
From the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM (2014) 172 final (Mar. 27, 2014),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/finances/docs/crowdfunding/140327-communi
cationen.pdf [hereinafter EC Communication].
109. See Directive 2004/39, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004
on Markets in Financial Instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC
and Directive 2000/12/EC repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC, 2004 O.J. (L 145/1).
110. Directive 2004/38, art. 1. "Member States shall require that, when providing investment
services and/or, where appropriate, ancillary services to clients, an investment firm act honestly,
fairly and professionally in accordance with the best interests of its clients and comply, in partic-
ular, with the principles set out" below to enhance fairness, transparency, efficiency. Id. art. 19.
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that deals with the reception, transmission, execution'1 ' of transfera-
ble stock market transactions. 112 It states "Member States shall re-
quire that investment firms take all reasonable steps to obtain, when
executing orders, the best possible result for their clients taking into
account price, costs, speed, likelihood of execution and settlement,
size, nature or any other consideration relevant to the execution of the
order." 113
When equity crowdfunding platforms emit market shares, they must
follow this direction to avoid sanctions. Each Member State has its
own regulatory agency and its own licensing requirements.
Crowdfunding platforms must fulfill these requirements in their home
countries and request a passport to trade shares in other countries.
Equity crowdfunding platforms that want to serve as a secondary mar-
ket for shares may need to abide by the Directive on Markets in Fi-
nancial Instruments to provide these services as well.
Second, crowdfunding platforms may collect funds - particularly
electronic payments - from investors, and hold these funds before they
are transferred to the fundraising company if the campaign is success-
ful or return them to the investors if the campaign fails. These actions
trigger multiple Directives. The collection of funds and movement of
funds implicates the Directive on Payment Services.1 14 This Directive
covers services enabling cash deposit to or from payment accounts,
payment transactions from debit or credit accounts, issuing and/or ac-
quiring payment instruments, money remittance, and payment agreed
through electronic means."15 Therefore, when platforms collect
money from investors to transfer to fundraisers, they carry out with
money and therefore qualify as a payment institution. As such, the
platforms must register'1 6 and comply with the home Member State
financial institution regulations; 1 7 and, importantly, they must hold
sufficient capital" 8 and implement safeguard measures."19
Holding funds in their own (trust) accounts also may qualify
crowdfunding platforms as credit institutions, which are institutions
111. Id. Annex I § A.
112. Id. Annex I § C.
113. Id. art. 21.
114. Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November
2007 on Payment Services in the Internal Market amending Directives 97/7[EC, 2002165[EC,
2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC, 2007 O.J. (L319/1).
115. Id. Annex.
116. See id. art. 13.
117. See id. art. 10.
118. See id. art. 8.
119. See Directive 2007/64/EC, art. 9.
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that "take deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to
grant credits for its own account.' 120 These institutions must comply
with the Directive on Capital Requirements ("CRD IV")121 and the
Regulations on Capital Requirements ("CRR"). 122
This CRD IV aims to enhance risk management by credit institu-
tions and investment firms. 23 Specifically, CRD IV affects the mini-
mum level of reserve credit institutions and investment firms must
hold in relation to different kinds of obligations. 24 On top of the min-
imum capital requirements, this Directive imposes certain buffers
(countercyclical capital buffer, 125 systemic risks buffer,1 26 and capital
conservation buffers127). It also imposes reporting requirement, pub-
lic disclosure requirement, and prudential requirements for credit in-
stitutions and investment firms with regard to their own funds in order
to limit large exposures. 128
Even if the crowdfunding platforms do not qualify as a credit insti-
tution, they may have to comply with CRD IV and CRR because they
may be classed as an investment firm. 29 An investment firm provides
services such as the reception and transmission of orders in relation to
120. A "'credit institution' means an undertaking the business of which is to take deposits or
other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account." Commission
Regulation 575/2013, art. 4, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on
Prudential Requirements for Credit Institutions and Investment Firms and amending Regulation
648/2012, 2013 O.J. (L 176/1).
121. Directive 2013/36/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on
Access to the Activity of Credit Institutions and the Prudential Supervision of Credit Institutions
and Investment Firms amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and
2006/49/EC, 2013 OJ (L 176/338).
122. Commission Regulation 575/2013.
123. European Commission, Protecting Taxpayers' Money Against Fraud: Commission Pro-
poses European Public Prosecutor's Office, EUROPA.EU MEX/13/0716 (July 16, 2013), available
at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEX-13-0717_en.htm?locale=EN.
124. The European Banking Authority received the task of implementing calculations for
fund requirement based upon information reported by individual Member State competent au-
thorities. See Directive 2013/36/EU, art. 78.
125. "It is therefore appropriate to require credit institutions and relevant investment firms to
hold, in addition to other own fund requirements, a capital conservation buffer and a
countercyclical capital buffer to ensure that they accumulate, during periods of economic
growth, a sufficient capital base to absorb losses in stressed periods." Id. at L 176/347, 1 80 &
art. 130, 135-40.
126. Id. art. 133-134.
127. Id. art. 129. "Member States shall require institutions to maintain in addition to the
Common Equity Tier 1 capital maintained to meet the own funds requirement .. .a capital
conservation buffer of Common Equity Tier 1 capital equal to 2,5% [sic] of their total risk expo-
sure amount." Id.
128. Directive 2013/36/EU, art. 1.
129. Directive 2004/39/EC, art. 4 § 1.
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one or more financial instruments1 30 - and platforms may easily qual-
ify as investment firms because they act as intermediaries between
contributors and fund seekers (including passing along orders). Plat-
forms would thus need to comply with certain licensing requirements
and hold enough capital to satisfy a capital requirement of (estimated
at eight percent).13 1
Third, crowdfunding platforms may also advise investors in which
companies to invest and hence trigger the Directive on Distance Mar-
keting of Financial Services. 132 This Directive addresses how financial
services may be provided from a distance. 33 Under a distance finan-
cial agreement, a financial service consumer must be provided ex-ante
with specific and clear information about the supplier, the financial
service provided, the contract, and methods of redress 134 - some of
this information must be provided in writing. 35 Crowdfunding plat-
forms may need to abide by this Directive because financial services
include investments.136 Platforms will need to make the terms of in-
vestment and the extent of their involvement in the investment clear
before the investors can invest, if they act as financial advisers.
Crowdfunding platform managers may manage funds to the point
that their advice elevates the platform to investment undertakings. In-
stead of providing intermediary services, platforms may choose to
pool their clients' funds, decide where to invest, and generally manage
these investments. While most crowdfunding platforms will not qual-
ify as an investment undertaking because platforms usually let inves-
tors invest in the companies of their choice, some platforms may
model their operating as a collective investment undertaking or they
130. Investment services and activities include: "(1) Reception and transmission of orders in
relation to one or more financial instruments. (2) Execution of orders on behalf of clients....
(5) Investment advice. (6) Underwriting of financial instruments and/or placing of financial in-
struments on a firm commitment basis. (7) Placing of financial instruments without a firm com-
mitment basis." Id. Annex I § A.
131. "The threshold [of 8 percent Common Equity Tier] is decomposed to 4.5 percent, which
is the ratio that will be legally mandatory as of 1 January 2014 according to Capital Requirement
Directive (CRD IV) and the Capital Requirement Regulation (CRR), a capital conservation
buffer of 2.5 percent, and an add-on of 1 percent to take into account the systemic relevance of
banks." Silvia Merler & Guntram B. Wolff, Ending Uncertainty: Recapitalisation Under Euro-
pean Bank Supervision, 18 BRUEGEL POL'Y CONTRIBUTION 1, 5 (2013).
132. Directive 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September
2002 concerning the Distance Marketing of Consumer Financial Services and amending Council
Directive 90/619/EEC and Directives 97/7/EC and 98/27/EC, 2002 O.J. (L 271/16).
133. A "'financial service' means any service of a banking, credit, insurance, personal pension,
investment or payment nature." Id. art. 2 § b.
134. See id. art. 3.
135. See id. art. 5.
136. Id. art. 2(b).
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may fall into a gray area. If a platform pools funds and invests these
funds, it may trigger one of the following four Directives (depending
on how this platform is structured and in what kind of companies it
chooses to invest): the Directive on Alternative Investment Fund
Managers ("AIFMs"), 137 the Directive on Undertakings for Collective
Investment in Transferable Securities ("UCITS"),1 38 the Regulation
on European Venture Capital1 39 and European Social Entrepreneur-
ship Funds.140
The four types of funds differ on whether they have a maturity date
and where the fund manager invests. UCITS are usually open-ended
funds that usually invest in publically traded companies whereas alter-
native investment funds ("AIFs") are hedge funds and private equity
funds. European Venture Capital consist venture capital funds in pri-
vate companies; and European Social Entrepreneurship Funds are
venture capital funds in private companies that have a social purpose.
These latter two types of funds invest in young and innovative compa-
nies, which usually involve higher risks because they lack track record.
In more details, the first two Directives deal with pooling funds.
The Directive on AIFMs141 introduced a harmonized set of rules 42
for AIFs in Europe because of the risks associated with these kinds of
funds.143 AIFs "means collective investment undertakings ... which:
(i) raise capital from a number of investors, with a view to investing it
in accordance with a defined investment policy for the benefit of those
investors; and (ii) do not require authorisation pursuant to [the
137. Directive 2011/61/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on
Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC
and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010, 2011 O.J. (L 174/1).
138. Directive 2009/65/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on
the coordination of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions relating to Undertakings
for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS), 2009 O.J. (L 302/32).
139. Commission Regulation 345/2013, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17
April 2013 on European Venture Capital Funds 2013 O.J. (L 11511).
140. Commission Regulation 346/2013, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17
April 2013 on European Social Entrepreneurship Funds 2013 O.J. (L 115/18).
141. Directive 2011/61/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on
Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC
and Regulations 1060/2009 and 1095/2010 2011 O.J. (L 174/1).
142. Id. L 174/1, 4 ("This Directive aims to provide for an internal market for AIFMs and a
harmonised and stringent regulatory and supervisory framework for the activities within the
Union of all AIFMs, including those which have their registered office in a Member State (EU
AIFMs) and those which have their registered office in a third country (non-EU AIFMs)").
143. Id. ("Recent difficulties in financial markets have underlined that many AIFM strategies
are vulnerable to some or several important risks in relation to investors, other market partici-
pants and markets. In order to provide comprehensive and common arrangements for supervi-
sion, it is necessary to establish a framework capable of addressing those risks taking into
account the diverse range of investment strategies and techniques employed by AIFMs.").
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UCITS Directive].' 1 44 AIFs have a minimum capital requirement 145
and clear enumeration policies 146 among other requirements. Their
managers - AIFMs - have authorization requirements 47 and must
manage risk adequately 48 among their various duties. The UCITS
Directive targets undertakings that are for "the sole object of collec-
tive investment in transferable securities or in other liquid financial
assets ... from the public and which operate on the principle of risk-
spreading; '149 and that have "units which are ... repurchased or re-
deemed, directly or indirectly, out of those undertakings' assets.' 150
These UCITS are usually common funds managed by management
companies, trusts, and open-ended variable or fixed capital
company. 51
The two latter regulations deal with venture funds. The Regula-
tions on European Venture Capital1 52 and European Qualifying Social
Entrepreneurship Funds impact on collective investment undertaking
that invest "at least 70% of its aggregate capital ... in qualifying in-
vestments. 1' 53 These qualifying investments include investments in
equity and quasi-equity instruments, secured and unsecured loans,
and in other venture capital companies. 54 Managers of a qualifying
venture have certain duties toward their clients 55 and disclosure re-
quirements.15 6 They also have to report to the competent authority.' 57
The investments that qualify under this Social Entrepreneurship
Funds Directive 158 further require that any entity in which funds are
invested "has the achievement of measurable, positive social impacts
as its primary objective in accordance with its articles of associa-
tion."'1 59 These objectives include "provid[ing] services or goods to
vulnerable or marginalised, disadvantaged or excluded persons, [and]
144. Id. art. 4 § 1.
145. Id. art. 9.
146. Directive 2011/61/EU, art. 13, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June
2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/
65/EC and Regulations 1060/2009 and 1095/2010 2011 O.J. (L 174/1).
147. See id. art. 8 § 2.
148. See id. art. 15.
149. Id. art. 1.
150. Directive 2009/65/EC, art. 1 § 2.
151. Id. art. 1 § 3.
152. See Commission Regulation 345/2013.
153. See Commission Regulation 346/2013, art. 3 § b.
154. Id. art. 3 § e.
155. See id. art. 7-9.
156. See id. art. 11-13.
157. See id. art. 14-16.
158. Commission Regulation 346/2013, art. 2.
159. Id. art. 3 § 1(d)(ii).
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employ[ing] a method of production of goods or services that embod-
ies its social objective.' 160
Since crowdfunding platforms raise funds from investors and invest
in private companies, a broad reading of these four Directives and
regulations may impact how crowdfunding platforms do business.
However, these platforms usually do not raise capital from investors
nor have control of the capital to the point of deciding in which com-
panies to invest.' 6' Similarly, most platforms do not offer portfolio
management and risk management services like traditional AIFs.162
All these regulations shape platforms and how they choose to oper-
ate and compete in the crowdfunding market. Some platforms set up
their operations to avoid being regulated. For instance, an equity
crowdfunding platform in Spain, named Socioslnversores, acts as an
"intermediary between entrepreneurs and investors. ' 163 This plat-
form puts investors and fund-raisers in contact, but the two parties
deal with each other directly and agree on a - possibly unique - con-
tract.1 64 This platform thus avoids having to comply with the Direc-
tive on Payment Services because it does not handle money. It also
avoids the Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments because it
does not emit any shares. The fundraising company directly collects
the funds from the investors and directly emits the shares to the inves-
tors. The Directive on Distance Marketing of Financial Services may,
however, still apply to Socioslnversores because they may still provide
advice.
These Directives and regulations present potential obstacles and
landmine for platforms. They must exercise extreme care. However,
160. Id.
161. The investing crowd usually targets specific campaigning companies. An issue may arise
if the company raising funds is a company that operates in the financial sector that these Direc-
tives target and would fall under these regulations. For simplicity of exposition, this discussion
ignores the possibility that investment funds use crowdfunding platforms to further invest.
162. Id. Annex I ("1. Investment management functions which an AIFM shall at least perform
when managing an AIF: (a) portfolio management; (b) risk management. 2. Other functions
that an AIFM may additionally perform in the course of the collective management of an AIF:
(a) Administration: (i) legal and fund management accounting services; (ii) customer inquiries;
(iii) valuation and pricing, including tax returns; (iv) regulatory compliance monitoring; (v)
maintenance of unit-/shareholder register; (vi) distribution of income; (vii) unit/shares issues and
redemptions; (viii) contract settlements, including certificate dispatch; (ix) record keeping; (b)
Marketing; (c) Activities related to the assets of AIFs.").
163. "Socioslnversores act[s] as an intermediary between entrepreneurs and investors but
do[es] not collect or distribute any money. For their services, the platform charges five [percent]
of the total amount invested in a project. This model means that the platform is able to avoid
legal limitations that other crowdfunding platforms can face, particularly if they take up roles
that are in some countries exclusive to banks." Green et al., supra note 15, at 60.
164. How It Works, SOCIOINVwERSORES.ES, https://www.sociosinversores.es/como-funciona/
(last visited Aug. 08, 2014).
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they only represent part of the regulatory puzzle. The companies that
use these platforms to raise fund are also regulated (in the way they
use them). The following paragraphs look at these fund-seeking com-
panies and how disclosure is central to their fund raising efforts.
The companies that attempt to raise funds may be impacted by the
Directive on Prospectus. 165 This Directive impacts equity crowdfund-
ing because it governs and harmonizes how companies present their
prospectus when they attempt to raise funds through offering securi-
ties to the public in Europe. 166 To ensure investor protection, "the
prospectus shall contain all information which ... is necessary to en-
able investors to make an informed assessment of the assets and liabil-
ities, financial position, profit and losses, and prospects of the issuer
and of any guarantor, and of the rights attaching to such securities." 167
This information includes the identity of directors and senior manage-
ment, offer statistics, and other key information about the company
and that helps calculate the risk factors. 68
This information must be constantly updated: the Directive requires
a supplement to be published to "ensure that investors base their in-
vestment decisions on the most recent financial information"' 169 when
new audited information is available. The statements must also dis-
close any information that allows investors to make an educated in-
vestment and evaluate the risks of investing,170 including the identity
of the main shareholder, updated audited financial statements, and
the like. 171
Campaign creators who emit shares following a successful
crowdfunding campaign may trigger this Directive. If it does, they
must comply with the Prospectus Requirement before starting fun-
draising. Requiring an extensive audited prospectus imposes real cost
165. Directive 2010/73/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November
2010 amending Directives 2003/71/EC on the Prospectus to be Published when Securities are
Offered to the Public or Admitted to Trading and 2004/109/EC on the Harmonisation of Trans-
parency Requirements in Relation to Information about Issuers Whose Securities are Admitted
to Trading on a Regulated Market 2010 O.J. (L 327/1); Directive 2003/71/EC, of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the Prospectus to be Published when
Securities are Offered to the Public or Admitted to Trading and amending Directive 2001/34/EC,
2003 O.J. (L 345/64).
166. Directive 2003/71/EC, L 345/64, 9 1.
167. Id. art. 5 § 1.
168. Id. Annex I.
169. Committee Delegated Regulation 1392/2014, % 6, of 7 March 2014 supplementing Direc-
tive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and Council with regard to Regulatory Standards
for Publication of Supplement to the Prospectus, 2014 O.J. (L 111/36).
170. See generally id.
171. Id.
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upon would-be fundraisers and hence decreases the pool of candidates
who are willing to incur the cost for a chance to raise funds.
However, this Directive has exemptions. 172 One exemption re-
quires that the security offering raises less than C5 million [$6.9 mil-
lion] 173 over a 12-month period 174 and that the securities are offered
to fewer than 150 natural persons. 175 Another exemption is "an offer
of securities with a total consideration of less than C100,000
[$138,000], which limit shall be calculated over a period of 12
months. ' 176 Some campaigns have used this exemption: for example
WiSeed in France. WiSeed, founded in 2008, is an equity crowdfund-
ing platform that allowed companies to raise up to C100,000 until
2012 taking advantage of this exemption. 177
The Directive on Prospectus also limits who may invest: if a valid
prospectus is provided, any investor can invest. Without prospectus,
"fewer than 150 natural ... persons per Member State" may invest in
a company; 78 though, any number of qualified investors are explicitly
authorized to invest.' 79 These qualified investors must fulfill certain
criteria (according to each Member State's regulations). Generally,
172. Directive 2003171/EC, art. 3.
173. Converting this value and other values in Euro in the rest of this paper using the Federal
Reserve Board exchange rate data on December 31, 2013 ($1.3799 to -1). Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, Historical Rates for the EU Euro, FDIEI)RAL-RI sEIZVl.cOv, http://
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/hlO/hist/datOOeu.htm (last visited Aug. 14, 2014).
174. Directive 2010/73/EU, art. 1 § 1(h), amending Directive 2003/71/EC art. 1 § 1(h) (increas-
ing the security offering from C2.5 million to C5 million).
175. This exemption requires that the security offering raises less than C5 million [$6.9 mil-
lion] over a 12-month period and one of the following requirements: that the securities are only
offered to qualified investors or that they offered to less than 150 natural persons or that the
equity is acquired for at least C100,000 by each investors or that each equity share is worth at
least C100,000 each. Directive 2003/71/EC, art. 3 § 2(a)-(d).
176. Directive 2003/71/EC, art. 3 § 2(e).
177. "WiSeed, supporting projects raising up to C100,000, via investments of not less than
l100 per investor, and also projects funded by less than 150 non-qualified investors." Reid
Feldman, Review of Crowdfunding Regulation Interpretations of existing regulation concerning
crowdfunding in Europe, North America and Israel, EUROPEAN CROWDFUNDING NFTwORK,
(Ed. Tax & Legal Work Group of the European Crowdfunding Network) (2013). Now WiSeed
allowed companies to raise up to one million euro. It partnered with a financial institution.
WiSeed Press Release https://s3-eu-west-l.amazonaws.com/wiseed-public-fr/mediatheque/cp-
gouvernance_030614.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2014). Interview of Thierry Merquiol, co-creator
of WiSeed (Jul. 7, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PX-O Yz NL4 (last visited Aug. 13,
2014). The change in the French regulation discussed in more details below also allows them to
raise up to similar funds.
178. Directive 2010/73/EU, art. 3 § 2(b), amending Directive 2003/71/EC, art. 3 § 2(b) (in-
creasing from 100 to 150 natural persons).
179. Directive 2003/71/EC, art. 2 § 1(e)(iv).
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they are either professional traders (who understand the risks associ-
ated with investing) or they are high net worth individuals.180
Media No Mad exemplifies a crowdfunding effort involving less
than 100 non-qualified investors. They raised C55,800 [$77,000] from
81 investors by selling 186 shares, which equates to fifteen percent of
their capital. 181 They aimed to raise C90,000 [$124,000] from under
100 investors.182 This venture was not completely done online; the
fundraiser went physically to investors to make them sign a non-com-
petition agreement as well as a non-disclosure agreement.18 3 How-
ever, this crowdfunding venture may have failed since the site has not
been updated since 2010.14
During a public consultation in 2013, the European Commission
found that the majority of respondents wished for some harmoniza-
tion.185 One way to insure harmonization is to leave the current crop
of already harmonized financial regulations as they are. Table 1 sum-
marizes the discussion above by showing which Directive or Regula-
tion affects which crowdfunding market participant. Each Member
State has, however, transposed these Directives and exemptions in
their own way. 18 6 This partly explains why equity crowdfunding has
developed differently in each Member State. 87 Adding another layer
of EU regulation may help or hurt harmonization. This communica-
tion serves many purposes: it warns crowdfunding participants that
the activity falls under current regulations and also informs citizens
that the governing body is paying attention and may do more in the
future.
180. A qualified investor must fulfill two of three following criteria:
(a) the investor has carried out transactions of a significant size on securities markets at
an average frequency of, at least, 10 per quarter over the previous four quarters; (b) the
size of the investor's securities portfolio exceeds EUR 0,5 million; (c) the investor
works or has worked for at least one year in the financial sector in a professional posi-
tion which requires knowledge of securities investment.
Id. art. 2 § 2.
181. Schwienbacher & Larralde, supra note 45, at 16.
182. Id. at 15.
183. Id.
184. About, BE NOOT, http://benoot.com/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2014).
185. See Digit - 1PM, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/ipm/forms/dis-
patch?userstate=cdisplayPublishedResults&form=CROWDFUNDING (last visited July 7,
2014).
186. See Review of Crowdfunding Regulation: Interpretations of Existing Regulation concern-
ing Crowdfunding in Europe, North America and Israel, EUROPEAN CROWDFUNDING NETWORK
(Tax & Legal Work Group of the European Crowdfunding Network, eds. 2013).
187. Some other differences may be cultural as well as economical - such as the average in-
come. These differences are also present in the U.S. at the state level.
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TABLE 1. APPLICABLE DIRECTIVES TO INDIVIDUAL ACTORS
WITHOUT NEW EXEMPTIONS
Actor Platform Fundraising Investors
Companies
Applicable (1) E-Money Prospectus Prospectus
Directives (2) Capital
Requirements
Undertakings for
Collective
Investment
(3) Alternative
Investment Fund
Manager
(4) Market in
Financial
Instrument
IV. OLD AND NEW REGULATIONS FOR CROWDFUNDING: THE
GROWING LIST OF COUNTRIES THAT HAVE NEW
REGULATIONS AND EXEMPTIONS
The United States (2012), Italy (2012-13), the United Kingdom
(2013-14) and France (2014) passed equity crowdfunding specific reg-
ulations. However, the scope and implementation differ greatly. This
Part describes regulations of the platform, fund-seeker, and investor
regulations for each country (in order of legislative actions).
A. The United States Limits the Investing Crowd
First in time, the United States acted as the benchmark for equity
crowdfunding regulations, but its implementation has suffered multi-
ple delays.18 8 Being a federation of states, the United States has mul-
tiple layers of regulations at both federal and state levels. The
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") implements the federal
regulations on Equity Crowdfunding via the Jumpstart Our Business
Startups ("JOBS") Act. The delayed implementation by the SEC has
188. Mary Jo White, Chairwoman of the Securities and Exchange Commission testified in
front of Congress in September 2014 and specified that "While the SEC has made significant
progress, more remains to be done on . . . Jumpstart Our Business Startups ("JOBS") Act
rulemakings .... Our responsibility is much greater than simply "checking the box" and declar-
ing the job done. We must be focused on fundamental and lasting reform." She also cites the
lack of funds as an issue. Mary Jo White, Chairwoman of the SEC, Testimony on "Wall Street
Reform: Assessing and Enhancing the Financial Regulatory System" before the United States
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Sept. 9, 2014), available at http://
www.sec.gov/News/Festimony/DetailTestimony/1370542893146.
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caused a number of states 189 to pass their own equity crowdfunding
acts190 and regulatory exemptions. 191 These efforts have some limited
impacts because these state laws that regulate the offering and sale of
securities (known as Blue Sky Laws) have many requirements. 192 Two
important ones are that the corporation must be incorporated in the
state where the shares may only be sold to residents of that state. 193
The requirements have limited the development of crowdfunding to
intra-state crowdfunding.
The following section focuses on interstate fund raising. In 2012,
the United States passed the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act
(JOBS Act). 194 U.S. legislators believe that a void exists between the
finances provided by banks and the ones provided by venture capital-
ists. 195 In the hopes of boosting economic growth, U.S. legislators ex-
tended investment opportunities to the whole population to fill this
void (known as the financial gap or valley of death). 196 Talks are un-
189. Jason Wiens, State Equity Crowdfunding Policies Hold Promise, FORBES (May 28, 2014,
10:18 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kauffman/2014/05/28/state-equity-crowdfunding-poli-
cies-hold-promise.
190. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-19-2-2 (LexisNexis effective July 1, 2015); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32 § 16304.6-A (2014); S. Res. 811, Reg. Sess. (Md. 2014) & H.R. Res. 1243, Reg. Sess.
(Md. 2014); Michigan Invests Locally Exemption, MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 451.2102a (West
2013); Washington Jobs Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 21.20.880 (LexisNexis 2014); 2013 Wis.
Act 52 (Wis. 2013).
191. See, e.g., Registration of Securities - Exempt Transactions, ALA. CODE § 8-6-11 (2015);
Invest Georgia Exemption, GA. CoMp. R. & REGS. 590-4-2-.08 (2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-
14-203 (decided on a case-by-case basis for an exemption); Invest Kansas Exemption, KAN. AD-
MIN. REGS. § 81-5-21 (2015); NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1106.01 (2014); Exemption from Registration
and Filing of Sales in Advertising Literature, TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1-103 (2015).
192. SEC Rule Interpretation, supra note 52, at 66,427. The Commerce Clause combined
with the Securities Act of 1933 limits how state entities can emit shares across state line.
193. SEC Rule Interpretation, supra note 52, at 66,510-11 (discussing Blue Sky laws - State
Securities Laws - that limit companies formed within that state to form equity offerings to resi-
dent of that state). For instance, the first successful such crowdfunding efforts in Michigan in-
volves Tecumseh Brewing Company and raised $175,000 from 21 investors. Michigan's First
Investment Crowdfunding Campaign, Tecumseh Brewing Co., a Success, LENAWEE Now (May 2,
2014), http://www.lenaweenow.org/michigan-investment-crowdfunding-campaign-tecumseh-
brewing-success/. This constitutes the first successful intrastate fund raising effort.
194. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306
(2012) (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
195. The JOBS Act intends to "increase American job creation and economic growth by im-
proving access to the public capital markets for emerging growth companies." Id. The SEC
"understand[s] that Title III was designed to help alleviate the funding gap and accompanying
regulatory concerns faced by startups and small businesses in connection with raising capital in
relatively low dollar amounts." SEC Rule Interpretation, supra note 52, at 66,430.
196. Id.
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derway in Congress to extend the JOBS Act exemption even
further.197
The U.S. Congress directed to the SEC to set and implement the
rules.198 First, the SEC required that any offering must be made
through an intermediary, who may either follow the traditional bro-
ker-dealer registration1 99 or may try to qualify for one of the exemp-
tions.20 0 Platforms can abide by the new funding portal regulation to
limit their cost of compliance.20 1 Under this new regulation, the plat-
forms cannot advise investors about financial investments, cannot so-
licit investors with regard to securities, cannot compensate employees
or agents for soliciting, and cannot handle investor funds or securi-
ties. 202 The SEC has the authority to extend this list of prohibited
activities. 20 3 These platforms must register with the SEC and a na-
tional securities association. 20
4
Congress and the SEC attempted to decrease the cost of entry for
platforms; however, they put the onus on these platforms to perform
some due diligence with respect to offerings20 5 and investors. 20 6 These
197. Ruth Simon & Agust Loten, Frustration Rises Over Crowdfunding Rules, WALL STREET
JOURNAL, (Apr. 30, 2014, 7:12 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230
4163604579532251627028512.
198. JOBS Act § 304(a)(2); SEC Rule Interpretation, supra note 52, at 66,429.
199. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(23) (2015).
200. One exemption not addressed here is Rule 506, which limits the number of individuals to
which the offering can be made. If the offering is made to less than 35 non-accredited purchaser,
for example, it qualifies for the safe harbor. See Regulation D - Rules Governing the Limited
Offer and Sale of Securities without Registration under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.506 (2015).
201. JOBS Act § 304(a)(1).
202. Id. § 304(b).
203. Id. SEC is, however, "not proposing at this time to exercise our discretion under Section
3(a)(80)(E) to prohibit any activities in which a funding portal may engage, other than those
identified in the statute." SEC Rule Interpretation, supra note 52, at 66,458.
204. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(a). Currently, the only national securities association is the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority. See About BrokerCheck Reports, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/
Investors/ToolsCalculators/BrokerChecklP015175 (last visited May19, 2015).
205. The funding platforms must make publicly available, twenty-one days prior to launching
the pitch, information regarding the issuer, and the sale/offer of securities. SEC Rule Interpreta-
tion, supra note 52, at 66,468. They must assure that the information is not misleading; it must
deny access and remove any offering that it "believes may present the potential for fraud." Id. at
66,489. The platforms are left to devise their own due diligence and can be held liable if it
presents "misleading or otherwise fraudulent [advertisements], such as by implying that past
performance of offerings on its platform is indicative of future results." Id. at 66,488 n.623.
206. The funding platforms must ensure that all investors positively affirm the risks involved
and qualify to make the investment according to the regulation (i.e., that the investors do not go
above their investment limits according to the schedule established by the SEC). SEC Rule
Interpretation, supra note 52, at 66,471.
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platforms must also use the all-or-nothing model because of its consid-
erable benefits (e.g., in limiting frauds).20 7
Next, the JOBS Act regulates company fundraising. First, the com-
pany must be a U.S. corporation. It can raise up to $1 million in a 12-
month period; this sum can be spread over multiple campaigns. Funds
raised by other means (such as loan, grants, or gifts) do not count
toward this aggregate sum of $1 million in 12 months.208 The issuing
corporations must disclose information such as name, legal status, or-
ganization, physical and website address, directors, etc. 20 9 Depending
on the amount (to-be) raised, the fundraiser has different filing re-
quirements: his/her tax returns for offerings less than $100,000; a fi-
nancial statement reviewed by an independent public accountant for
offerings from $100,000 to $500,000; an audited financial statement for
offerings over $500,000.210 These requirements have an initial cost 2 11
as well as a yearly compliance cost.212 While these disclosure require-
ments cost less than under the traditional IPO,213 they may limit eq-
uity crowdfunding to more substantial offerings.
Finally, the JOBS Act limits how much and how frequently people
can invest. All individuals can annually invest up to a tiered thresh-
old: if the investor's net-worth plus income is less than $40,000, then
he or she can only invest up to $2,000; if his or her net-worth and
income combine to less than $100,000, then he or she can invest five
percent of his or her income in equity crowdfunding endeavors; if his
or her income or net-worth is greater than $100,000, then the limit is
ten percent of his/her income in equity crowdfunding. 21 4 Because
these rules have yet to be implemented, it remains to be seen how
these limits function.
207. See Transmission or Maintenance of Payments Received in Connection with Underwrit-
ings, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-4. "[Tihis rule was designed to prevent fraud 'either upon the person
on whose behalf the distribution is being made or upon the customer to whom the payment is to
be returned if the distribution is not completed."' SEC Rule Interpretation, supra note 52, at
66,473. The proposed rules require that the offering specifies a minimum amount - the thresh-
old - as well as a maximum offering. Id. at 66,474.
208. Id. at 66,430.
209. Id. at 66,428.
210. Id. at 66,430 & 66,443.
211. For instance, the U.S. disclosing requirements have an estimated initial cost between
$18,560 to $152,260 - depending on the size of fund raised - as compared to estimated $1.5
million for IPOs. See SEC Rule Interpretation, supra note 52, at 66,521 & 66,509.
212. For instance, the U.S. disclosing requirements have an estimated annual cost between
$600 to $33,600 - depending on the size of fund raised - as compared to estimated $2.5 million
for IPOs. See id.
213. Id.
214. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B); see also SEC Rule Interpretation, supra note 52, at 66,430.
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B. Italy focuses on Innovative Early Stage Investment
In 2012 and 2013, Italy passed laws and regulations that oversee
how equity crowdfunding functions.215 These laws, like the U.S. regu-
lations, have opted to regulate platforms and investors; furthermore,
these laws also regulate what kind of companies can raise funds.
First, crowdfunding must be done through an on-line platform or
portals "with the exclusive purpose of facilitating the collection of risk
capital on the part of the innovative start-ups. '216 Platforms must reg-
ister with Commissione Nationale per le Societd e la Bors, ("CON-
SOB") the regulating agency.217 Only a bank or investment company
can manage a portal218 or register the portal for future use.219 The
managers of these portals must have at least two years' experience in
legal or economic work220 and follow a set of conduct rules including
"work diligence, fairness and transparency, avoiding any conflicts of
interest[.] ' 221 The manager has the duty to keep up-to-date informa-
tion on the portal222 about the startups and disclose the risks involved,
the taxation of each investment type, and etc.223 The regulation also
215. Legge 17 dicembre 2012, n. 221 (It.). Commissione Nationale per le Societa e la Borsa
Reg. 26 giugno 2013 n. 18592 (CONSOB Reg.) (the Italian financial markets regulator).
216. CONSOB Reg. 26 giugno 2013, n. 18592, at art. 2 § d (available in English at http://
www.consob.it/mainen/documenti/english/laws/reg18592e.htm). As of May 19, 2015, fourteen
platforms were registered. Register of Portal Managers Established Pursuant to Art. 50-Quin-
quies of Legislative Decree No. 58/1998, CONSOB (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.consob.it/mainen/
documenti/intermediari/portali/gestori-portali.xml?xsl=gestorden.xsl&symblink=/mainen/in-
termediares/portali/os.html.
217. Id. art. 4 § 1.
218. Id. "The management of portals for the collection of capital for innovative start-ups is
reserved to the investment companies and banks authorised to provide the relative investment
services and to the subjects entered on a special register held by Consob, providing these latter
transmit the orders regarding the underwriting and trading of financial instruments representing
capital exclusively to banks and investment companies." Consolidated Law, Decreto Legisla-
tivo, 24 febbraio 1998, n. 52, art. 50-quinquies (It.), introduced by D.L. n. 179/2012, converted
into L. n. 221/2012. The regulation implies that the portal may be separate, but must associate
with a bank or an investment company that will provide the underwriting of the offerings. Per-
mitted managers must be registered and must meet specific requisites. Id. art. 50-quinquies § 3.
219. Alternatively, the platforms can request an annotation in the special section of the regis-
ter if it is owned by a bank or investment company and intends in the future to operate as a
portal. CONSOB Reg. n. 18592/2013, at art. 4 § 2. One platform was automatically registered
under the special section of CONSOB regulations. See Register of Portal Managers Established
Pursuant to Art. 50-Quinquies of Legislative Decree No. 58/1998, CONSOB (Mar. 30, 2015),
http://www.consob.it/mainen/documenti/intermediari/portai/banche-iv.xml?xsl=gest
_spec.en.xsl&symblink=/mainen/intermediares/portali/ss.html.
220. CONSOB Reg. n. 18592/2013, art. 9.
221. Id. art. 13.
222. Id. art. 14 & 17.
223. Id. art. 15. Article 16 requires the disclosure with regard to the information offer.
2015] EQUITY CROWDFUNDING: ALL REGULATED BUT NOT EQUAL 391
includes a set of sanctions if the manager fails to comply with these
requirements. 224
The Italian regulations limit both the type of companies that can
raise funds and how much they can raise. They limit fundraising to C5
million per 12 months.225 Only innovative startups, including startups
with a social vocation,226 can use the prospectus requirement exemp-
tion. An innovative startup is a company that owned or controlled by
natural persons, that was established less than forty-eight months
prior, is subject to Italian tax or has its headquarters in Italy, has turn-
overs of lower than C5 million, does not distribute profits, and pro-
duces innovative products in the high technological sector.227
Innovative startups must also have at least either invested fifteen per-
cent of their budget in research and development; or more than one-
third of their employees must have research degrees (masters or doc-
torates); or, it must hold patents for either industrial, electronic or
biotechnological inventions or inventions of new vegetable vari-
eties.228 These requirements limit the companies that can use
crowdfunding as a financial means in their early stages, which may
involve more risks. Additionally, companies can only emit "financial
instruments" that represent a share or stakes of the capital.229
Finally, CONSOB also regulates investors in a unique way: CON-
SOB requires that "at least 5% of the financial instruments offered
are undersigned by professional investors or by banking foundations
or by innovative start-up incubators[.]" 230 This requirement serves as
a stamp of approval from the professional investing community and
aims to prevent fraudulent investments or investments destined to fail.
However, beyond this requirement, CONSOB did not create any spe-
cific category of investors or put a limit on their investments. Inves-
tors are afforded some protection and may even change their minds
before the project is fully funded - within certain limits. 231
224. Id. art. 23.
225. Decreto Sviluppo Bis, Decreto Legge 18 ottobre 2012, n. 179, art. 25 § 1.d (It.) converted
into L. n. 221/2012.
226. CONSOB Reg. n. 18592/2013, art. 2 § 1.c.
227. D.L. 179/2012, art. 25.
228. Id. art. 25 § 2h. See Investor Education: Important Things to Know Before Investing in
Innovative Start-Ups through a Portal, CONSOB, also press releases of the explained regulations
at http://www.consob.it/mainen/consob/publications/start-ups.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2014), for
an explanation of the Italian law in English.
229. CONSOB Reg. n. 18592/2013, art. 2.
230. Id. art. 24.
231. Investors can withdraw their order under two circumstances: first, within seven days of
ordering and second, within seven days of having knowledge of a material mistake that would
"influence the decision on the investment." Id. art 13 § 5 & 25 § 2.
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Since the new law was passed, a few platforms have registered with
CONSOB.2 32 Stars Up, the first platforms to be registered, 233 com-
pleted its first successful fundraising project in August 2014.234 This
platform helped raise funds for Cantiere Savona, a start-up that pro-
duces solar-motor boats. 235 It raised C380,000 from forty-four inves-
tors or about C8,600 (about $12,000) per investor. It is interesting to
note that there was an eight business-day delay between reaching the
fund threshold and achieving the requisite five percent threshold from
professional investors.236 The tastes of professional investors may dif-
fer from those of this new investing crowd. This difference may limit
the projects being funded to those that attract traditional professional
investors: the five percent-professional-fund requirement may allevi-
ate some problems of fraud, but it encourages the same funding
patterns.
C. The United Kingdom Extends Within Limits the Investing
Crowd
In 2013, the United Kingdom's Financial Conduct Authority
("FCA") affirmed that investment-based crowdfunding platforms
were regulated like any broker-dealer. In addition, fund seekers need
to have a valid prospectus (unless their fundraising can take advan-
tage of an exemption). However, this new regulation did extend the
definition of qualified investors.237
232. See supra notes 217 & 226.
233. Unicaseed technically is the first platform in the special section and completed the first
equity crowdfunding project in March, 2014. See Naomi O'Leary, Startup Completes First Equity
Crowdfunding Drive in Italy, REUTERS (Apr. 1, 2014, 2:28 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2014/04/01/us-italy-crowdfunding-idUSBREA301NB20140401. However, because this platform
was operating under a different regime, it may be counted differently. See Marco Viviani, Star-
sUp, Primo Portale di Crowdfunding, WEBNEWS (Oct. 28, 2013, 5:04 PM), http://
www.webnews.it2013/10/28/starsup-portale-crowdfunding-startup/. Unicaseed is a subsidiary of
Unicasism, which is regulated by CONSOB and the Bank of Italy. See J.D. Alois, First Italian
Equity Crowdfunding Offer Closes, CROWDFUNDING INSIDER (Apr. 1, 2014, 9:59 PM), http:f/
www.crowdfundinsider.com/2014/04/35023-first-italian-equity-crowdfunding-offer-closes/.
234. Alessandro Lerro, Italy's First Year of Equity Crowdfunding, CROWDSOURCING.ORG
(Aug. 18, 2014, 8:17 PM), http://www.crowdsourcing.org/editorial/italys-first-year-of-equity-
crowdfunding/33287.
235. See Cantiere Savona SRL, STARSUP, http://www.starsup.it/project/cantiere-savona-srUI
(last visited Aug. 19, 2014).
236. Observation made from checking the website regularly.
237. See Financial Conduct Authority, The FCA's Regulatory Approach to Crowdfunding
(and Similar Activities), Consultation Paper 13/13, 4 (Oct. 2013), available at http://
www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/consultation-paperslcpl3-13.pdf [hereinafter Consultation
Paper].
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First, crowdfunding platforms must be licensed 238 as of April
2014.239 Crowdfunding platforms will incur two types of compliance
costs. Industry experts estimate that these authorization procedures
will cost about £150,000 (about $250,000)24o and requires six to nine
months worth of compliance work before filing. The process will take
a further six months (after filing). 241 The FCA estimates that the new
regulation will cost an additional £3,000 ($5,000) to already-regulated
crowdfunding platforms. 242 The new regulation puts limitation on eq-
uity crowdfunding platforms solely with regard to promotion and re-
quires that platforms have a compliance director. 243 Some platforms
have already complied ahead of the October deadline. 244
Second, the U.K. adopted financial regulations similar to the EU
Directive on Prospectus discussed above. Thus, fund-seeking compa-
238. "[I]f a crowdfunding platform enables a business to raise money by arranging the sale of
unlisted equity or debt securities, or units in an unregulated collective investment scheme, then
this is 'investment-based crowdfunding' regulated by the FCA and the firm operating the
crowdfunding platform needs to be authorised." Id. at 4.
239. Platforms have until the end of the transition period to comply with these registration
requirements. "For investment-based crowdfunding and similar activities we proposed a transi-
tional period allowing firms the option of either complying with the new rules from 1 April 2014,
or complying with existing rules until 1 October 2014 and then applying the new rules from that
date." Financial Conduct Authority, The FCA 's Regulatory Approach to Crowdfunding over the
Internet, and the Promotion of Non-Readily Realisable Securities by Other Media: Feedback to
CP13/13 and Final Rules, Policy Statement 14/4, 12 (Mar. 2014), available at http://www.
fca.org.uk/static/documents/policy-statements/psl4-04.pdf [hereinafter Policy Statement].
240. Converting this value and other values in British Pound Sterlings in the rest of this paper
using the Federal Reserve Board exchange rate data on December 31, 2013 ($1.6574 to £1).
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Historical Rates for the UK Pound, FEDER-
ALREsERVE.Gov, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/hlO/hist/datOO_uk.htm (last visited
Aug. 14, 2014).
241. Simon Deane-Johns, Response to the Financial Conduct Authority Consultation on
Crowdfunding (CP 13/13), 13 (citing the Fintech Challenger Business Workshop, October 2013),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/consultations/2013/crowdfunding/docs/contribu-
tions/individuals-and-others/keystone-law-en.pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2014). It is not clear
whether this cost applies only to loan-based crowdfunding platforms or both equity and loan
crowdfunding platforms. Nonetheless, these costs exist for equity crowdfunding platforms as
well since equity-based crowdfunding must obtain a license under the Financial Services and
Markets Act 2000 and comply with Chapter 4 of the FCA's Conduct of Business Sourcebook
(COBS 4 - Communicating with clients, including financial promotions). These compliance
measures impose costs on the platform for each offering; thus, the costs presented may be biased
downward.
242. See Consultation Paper, supra note 237, at 57 & Table 11.
243. See id. at 47.
244. See The Financial Services Register, FINANCIAL CONDucr AUTHORIrY, http://
www.fsa.gov.uk/register/firmBasicDetails.dosid=290368 (last visited July 24,2014), for an exam-
ple of a U.K. platform that has received such certification. The crowdfunding platform,
Crowdcube, also specifies on its website that it received the appropriate status to emit shares.
Accreditations and Associations, CROWDCUBE, http://www.crowdcube.com/pg/accreditations-and
-associations-80 (last visited July 24, 2014).
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nies must comply with existing regulations on prospectuses. 245 In
other words, the company seeking funds must submit its prospectus to
the relevant authority and have it approved; it must release a public
prospectus ahead of time, a declaration of accurate information, finan-
cial information, the investment objective, organizational structure,
and risk factors.246 This prospectus must also specify whether any of
the managers have been convicted of a crime. 247
The U.K. also adopted similar exemptions to the Directive on Pro-
spectus discussed in more detail above. For instance, no prospectus is
required for investments up to C5 million248 that involved fewer 150
non-qualified investors and any number of qualified investors or for
investment that does not exceed C100,000.249
Third, the new FCA regulation "aims to make investment-based
crowdfunding more accessible to a wider, but restricted, audience of
consumers. ' '250 The new regulation expands who can invest: a bigger
but restricted crowd. The FCA is worried about the exposure of unso-
phisticated investors to these investments, thus it limits the promotion
investors may receive.251 Platforms can only directly communicate
with retail clients that are certified 252 or self-certify253 as sophisticated
245. "The rules we consulted on do not affect or limit the applicability of existing legislation,"
which are in "sections 755 and 756 the Companies Act 2006 [and] section 85 of the [Financial
Services and Markets Act 2000] .. " Policy Statement, supra note 239, at 40; see also Financial
Services and Markets Act 2000 § 84 (U.K.).
246. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, c. 8, § 87A; see also Guide to Listing Depositary
Receipts, LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE, http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-ad-
visors/main-market/documents/brochures/guidetolistingdepositaryreceipts.pdf (last visited Aug.
14, 2014).
247. Guide to Listing Depositary Receipts, supra note 246, at 79.
248. The Prospectus Regulations 2012, S.I. 2012/1668; see also HM Treasury, Consultation on
Early Implementation of Amendments to the Prospectus Directive, Gov.uK (Mar. 2011), available
at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/systeni/uploads/attachment-data/file/81265/consult_
early-implementation-amendpd.pdf.
249. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 § 86(1).
250. Consultation Paper, supra note 237, at 36.
251. Communicating with Clients, including Financial Promotions (COBS 4), in CONDUCT OF
BUSINESS SOURCEBOOK, 4.7.7-.8 (Mar. 2015), available at http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/hand
book/COBS [hereinafter COBS]. But see Consultation Paper, supra note 237, at 38 ("We have
no evidence to show that the wrong type of investor is investing in unlisted shares or debt securi-
ties. It is possible our current regulatory approach is effectively preventing this. However, we
have historically identified instances of non-compliant promotion of unlisted shares by firms
using mailings or telephone-based business models. We expect the proposals outlined in this
[Consultation Paper] to minimise the risk of such promotions in future.").
252. A certified sophisticated investor must: (1) have an independent certificate - at most 36
months old - proving he understands the risks associated with investing; and (2) have "signed,
within the period of twelve months ending with the day on which the communication is made,
[the Sophisticated Investor Statement]." COBS, supra note 251, at 4.12.7.
253. A self-certified sophisticated investor is an individual who has "signed, within the period
of twelve months ending with the day on which the communication is made, [the Self-Certified
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investors; retail clients who are certified as high net worth investors;25 4
retail clients who confirm they have received investment advice; and
retail clients who will not invest more than ten percent of their net
investible portfolio.255 This last category codified as a certified re-
stricted investor is the most noticeable change. Under these new regu-
lations, platforms can accept contributions from any investors who
certify in writing that they have not and will not invest more than ten
percent of their net assets in a twelve months period.256
In short, these updated regulations achieve two aims. First, they
regulate how platforms present information about investing - specifi-
cally they require disclosure about the risks involved257 and the plat-
forms are responsible for making sure that only authorized investors
are contributing.258 Second, these new regulations extended the defi-
nition of investors beyond the traditional certified/self-certified inves-
tors and high net worth individuals. It limits investors (who willingly
take on the risks) to ten percent of their portfolio;259 but it ultimately
widens the pool of investors - and hence the funds available.
The FCA focuses its attention on investment. Even though regula-
tions for platforms and companies were not specifically affected, in-
cluding them in the newly released guideline discussion emphasizes to
platforms and fund-seeking companies their obligations, their limita-
tions, and their rights.
CrowdCube is among the most successful equity crowdfunding web-
sites in the U.K. Having a publicly available webpage for any
crowdfunding investment effort may qualify as prohibited promotion;
hence, CrowdCube requires people to login260 and certify themselves
Sophisticated Investor Statement]"; a statement that acknowledges the risks involve with invest-
ing, worked in the financial sector with a company with at least £1 million turnover. Id. at 4.12.8.
254. The investor "had, throughout the financial year ... an annual income to the value of
£100,000 or more;" or "held, throughout the financial year ... net assets to the value of £250,000
or more." Id. at 4.12.6.
255. Id. at 4.7.10; Consultation Paper, supra note 237, at 38.
256. COBS, supra note 251, 4.7.10; Consultation Paper, supra note 237, at 38. Net assets do
not include primary residence (including attached mortgage), mine rights, and any benefits (i.e.
life insurance and service termination benefits) and who certifies that he understand the risk
exposure. See Consultation Paper, supra note 237, at Appendix 1, Annex D.
257. Consultation Paper, supra note 237, at 44. ("Where reputation and learning is insuffi-
cient, better disclosure of information can help investors make more informed assessments of
whether crowdfunding investments are suitable for them. It can also help reduce the risk of
potential fraud.")
258. Platforms must test investors, via the 'appropriateness test,' which assures that only au-
thorized investors are contributing by "assess[ing] client knowledge and experience to check
understanding of risks." Id. at 58.
259. COBS, supra note 251, 4.7.10.
260. CrowdCube offers the following disclaimer when a member of the public attempts to
access an investment pitch: "[t]his investment opportunity is not an offer to the public and is only
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as qualified investors before accessing any information about offer-
ing.261 The website also contains a warning about the risk of investing
in startups.262
D. France Wants Platforms to Control the Flow of Funding
France became one of the most recent European countries to pass
its own crowdfunding regulations. 263 In 2014, the French Ministry of
Finance created a new crowdfunding exemption following a consulta-
tion period in 2013.264 This new statute came into effect October 1,
2014.265
The French ordinance focuses first on the platforms. It creates a
new status for platforms and calls them "conseillers en investissements
participatifs," which is an investment-crowdfunding adviser.266 These
advisers, much like traditional financial adviser, must have the re-
quired qualifications 267 and register with the proper authority;268 they
must have proper civil insurance2 69 and follow a code of ethics.270 Ad-
visers must also make their information public, explain how they se-
available to registered members of Crowdcube.com who have qualified and categorised them-
selves as able to invest." See, e.g., Staks, CROWDCUBE, https://www.crowdcube.com/investment/
staks-19011 (last visited May 18, 2015). CrowdCube states that: "By registering or logging into
Crowdcube.com to view the investment opportunity, you certify that you are legally entitled to
view the investment opportunities, are an authorised investor and you agree to all applicable
terms and conditions on this website, including this disclaimer." Id.
261. CrowdCube states that "[in order to access the pitch you must first become a qualifying
member of Crowdcube on the basis of your status as either (i) self-certified 'high net worth
investor', (ii) certified 'sophisticated investor', (iii) self-certified as a 'sophisticated investor' or
(iv) certified as a 'restricted investor', in each case in accordance with the FCA's Conduct of
Business Sourcebook Chapter 4.7." Id.
262. Due to the new guidelines, CrowdCube now states that "[i]nvesting in start-ups and early
stage businesses involves risks, including illiquidity, lack of dividends, loss of investment and
dilution, and it should be done only as part of a diversified portfolio." Id.
263. See Ordonnance 2014-559 du 30 mai 2014 relative au financement participatif [Ordinance
2014-556 of May 30, 2014 on Participatory Financing], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE
FRANc;AISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZEFrrE OF FRANCE], May 31, 2014, p. 9075.
264. See Fr~dric Cazenave & Jdr6me Porier, La france se met d l'heure du "crowdfunding,"
LE MONDE (Oct. 20, 2013, 4:41 PM), http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2013/10/20/la-
france-se-met-a-l-heure-du-crowdfunding_3499710_3234.html; Fr6ddric Cazenave, La France
veut accilrer l'essor du financement participatif, LE MONDE (Feb. 14, 2014, 2:54 PM), http://
www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2014/02/14/paris-veut-accelerer-l-essor-du-financement-partici
patif_4366520_3234.html.
265. Ordonnance 2014-559, art. 37.
266. Id. art. 1 § 1 at L. 547-1. Note that traditional advisers ("prestataire de services
d'investissement") may also serve as intermediary for these crowdfunding efforts. Id. art. 8.
267. See id. art. 1 § 2 at L. 547-3.
268. Id. art. 1 § 2 at L. 547-4. Note that these advisers must also submit to formation and pass
the AMF test.
269. Ordonnance 2014-559, art. 1 § 2 at L. 547-5.
270. Id. art. 1 § 3 at L. 547-9.
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lect the projects, and disclose their remuneration (which cannot be in
the form of shares).2 71 They must advise investors about the risks in-
volved and publish an annual report of their activities. 272 Finally, they
must conduct their activities through an internet website.273 Most of
the ordinance focuses on this new status for equity crowdfunding plat-
forms and puts the onus on them to perform due diligence.
The ordinance also creates an exemption to the prospectus require-
ment. Companies can raise up to an amount specified by decree, over
twelve months, without having to adhere to the traditional prospectus
requirement.2 74 A prospectus is not required because this type of fun-
draising does not qualify as a public offering. The decree limits the
raise-able funds at C1 million.2 75 The companies that are crowdfund-
ing must disclose a document containing minimal information for in-
vestors to invest accordingly.2 76 Neither the ordinance nor the decree
limits investors.277
The ordinance did not create equity crowdfunding in France, but it
facilitated the hoops through which platforms had to jump. It allevi-
ated some of the costs by creating a new category of financial adviser
for platforms and created a new exemption for company prospectus.
For instance, WiSeed was operating before this new ordinance came
into force and had already raised about C8.7 million in forty-four
271. Id. art. 1 § 2 at L. 547-6-A & art. 17 § 3 at L. 548-6.
272. Id. art. 17 § 3 at L. 548-6.
273. Id. art. 17 § 3 at L. 548-1. Note that the crowdfunding platforms may have to hold suffi-
cient capital if they qualify as a limited payment establishment because it may divest funds ac-
cording to the success of the campaign. Ordonnance 2014-559, art. 16 at L. 522-11-1.
274. See id. art. 11 at L. 411-2.
275. Loi 2014-1053, art. I at D. A 548-1, du 16 septembre 2014 relatif au financement par-
ticipatif, [Law 2014-1052, art. I at D. A 548-1, of September 16, 2014 on Participatory Financing],
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RI PUBLIQUE FRAN(;AISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETYE OF FRANCE],
Sept. 17, 2014, p. 15228.
276. "Une information minimale doit 8tre ddlivrde aux investisseurs par la plate-forme sur son
site internet. Les soci~t6s qui recourent A ce mode de financement ne pourront pas opter pour la
confidentialit6 de leurs comptes." In English: "Minimum information must be issued to inves-
tors by the platform on its website. Companies that use this method of financing will not be able
to opt for the privacy of their accounts." Rapport au President de la Republique relatif a
l'Ordonnance 2014-559 du 30 mai 2014 relative au financement participatif [Report to the Presi-
dent with regard to Ordinance 2014-559 on Participatory Financing], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
RPPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [JO.] [OFFICIAL GAZE~rE OF FRANCE], May 31, 2014, p. 9074.
277. The decree specifically limits the amount per project and per investor for lending
crowdfunding. Loi 2014-1053, art. 1. Contributors are limited to 1,000 per project for loans for
personal reasons (capped at a 7-year loan) and 4,000 per project for zero-rate loans for profes-
sional endeavors. Id. art. I at D. 548-1. The lending loans are also capped at one million euros
per professional project. Id. Therefore, since the decree is silent on other limits for equity
crowdfunding, contributors are not limited in their investment.
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projects.278 WiSeed focuses on innovative startups (less than eight
years old) in the health, biotech, digital, environment, industry and
service sector.2 79 While they welcome the new ordinance because it
lends legitimacy to equity crowdfunding,280 they have been operating
as a "prestataire de services d'investissement," i.e. financial adviser
under the old regime through a partnership with Alternativa.281 One
of its success stories involves a biotech start-up named Antabio that
raised C300,000 (about $414,000) and, eighteen months later, sold the
shares to a business angel for a forty-four percent return on invest-
ment.282 This kind of result should not be generalized, but it shows
the potential of equity crowdfunding for investors.
All these countries require an audited prospectus for IPO but at-
tempted to accommodate, within limits, crowdfunding. These coun-
tries, however, differ on how they accommodated fund seeking
companies. Table 2 offers a summary of the crowdfunding regulations
discussed above.
278. A Propos, WISEED, https://www.wiseed.com/fr/qui-sommes-nous (last visited Aug. 20,
2014).
279. Questions / Responses, WISEED, https://www.wiseed.com/fr/entrepreneur/lever-des-
fonds-avec-wiseed/questions-reponses (last visited Aug. 20, 2014).
280. Interview by Valerie Talmon with Stdphanie Savel, President, WiSeed (June 16, 2014)
(video available at Les enjeux du crowdfunding, LEs EcHos (June 16, 2014, 2:33 PM), http://
videos.lesechos.fr/3624928006001 (last visited Aug. 20, 2014)).
281. Pascale Besses-Boumard, La finance participative fait des dmules, LA TRIBUNE (Jan. 21,
2014 6:59 AM), http://www.latribune.fr/bourse/actualite/20130122tribOO0744093/la-finance-partic
ipative-fait-des-emules.html.
282. A Model that Knew Its First Success, WISEED, https://s3-eu-west-l.amazonaws.com/
wiseed-public-fr/mediatheque/antabio-infographie.jpg (last visited Aug. 20, 2014).
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TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF REGULATIONS
United States Italy United Kingdom France
Platforms Licensed Licensed Licensed Licensed
Insurance
Fundraising Restrictions: Restrictions: Cap: C5 million Cap: C1 million
Companies Yearly filings Young, Small every 12 months every 12 months
Cap: $1 million Innovative
every 12 months Companies
Cap: C5 million
every 12 months
Investors Tiered 5% invested 10% of assets No restrictions
investment from
thresholds: professional
(1) $2,000 for investors
under $40,000
net worth
(2) 5% of
income or net
worth if income
and net worth
between $40,000
and $100,000
(3) 10% of
income or net
worth if income
and net worth
over $100,000
V. DISCUSSION AND CASE STUDY
This Part compares how different countries have approached
crowdfunding regulations. To conclude, this Part first compares the
regulations and their consequences across the jurisdictions previously
discussed. This Part finally looks at how a platform, CrowdCube and
its investors, have performed under the new U.K. regulation.
A. Comparing Regulations
Countries approach the new phenomenon of equity crowdfunding
in one of three ways. This Article investigates two of these three main
approaches. Though it does not go into the third approach ("holding
pattern"), it discusses examples that demonstrate that most countries
already have in place extensive regulations for public offerings (e.g.,
Australia and the EU Directives/Regulations). Crowdfunding actors
can comply with these regulations, though this is expensive; or, they
can take advantage of their exemptions to crowdfund in a limited way.
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On the one hand, creating further regulations may require revisiting
previous regulations or to creating consistent new exemptions; legisla-
tors need to weigh the cost of these new regulations against their ben-
efits. Thus, some countries may opt to let the current regulations
address equity crowdfunding because these regulations are already
proven and functioning - particularly when it comes to investor
protection.
On the other hand, when regulators and legislators opt to follow a
holding pattern, they ignore three important issues. First, some uncer-
tainties about which regulations apply may hinder crowdfunding. 283
Affirming what regulations apply would alleviate those uncertainties
and send a signal about the industry.284 Second, current regulations
may be so costly that, without an exemption, crowdfunding may not
exist at all. Current regulations may create barriers to entry for large
source of investment. Third, if crowdfunding does not exist in one
country, citizens may still decide to invest in crowdfunding projects
aboard. 28 5 Some countries, like the U.K., allow foreign crowds to in-
vest in their market and may well attract foreign funds who do not
have a crowdfunding alternative at home. 286
283. See Weinstein, supra note 53, at 447 (2013) ("In Germany, for instance, the basic assump-
tion until recently was that crowdfunding platforms could only raise as much as 100,000 per
project. The founder of equity platform Seedmatch challenged this paradigm though, by draw-
ing up arrangements between investors and equity-offering companies based on 'a so called 'par-
tiarisches Darlehen' or a profit participating loan' contract. The German financial authority
recognized and accepted this bit of innovation, and Seedmatch can now raise equity rounds
above the _100,000 limit, but it faces an uncertain future with regards to laws governing the
screening of potential investors and fundraisers.").
284. Even though WiSeed already complies with the current regulation, its president ex-
pressed the importance of the government legitimizing the industry with its new ordinance. See
Interview by Valerie Talmon with Stdphanie Savel, supra note 280.
285. For instance, in the U.S., the SEC affirms that non-U.S. residents will be able to invest in
the U.S. and "the [investment] limitations would apply to all investors, including retail, institu-
tional or accredited investors and both U.S. and non-U.S. citizens or residents." SEC Rule
Interpretation, supra note 52, at 66,434.
286. Being able to invest abroad has a number of consequences. Platforms will compete inter-
nationally, which should decrease their fees. Projects will also compete across borders, which
may decrease the number of fraudulent projects because they will need to send costly signals to
get funded. Investors will be able to invest abroad and should be able to diversify their invest-
ments and decrease their shock exposure. However, this discussion is beyond the scope of this
paper. For instance, Seedrs, a U.K. based website, states in 2014, six of the successfully funded
projects came from outside the U.K., namely Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Portugal, and
Spain. All six countries did not have active crowdfunding specific regulations in 2014. Seedrs
also states that investors in thirty-one countries are active on the site, which means that investors
from countries without crowdfunding specific regulations were likely investing in the U.K. See
Alysia Wanczyk, 2014 at a Glance, SEEDRS, http://learn.seedrs.com/2014-infographic/ (last visited
May 26, 2015).
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This Article investigated the other two approaches that countries
have deployed when faced with equity crowdfunding: reaffirming
which regulations apply to crowdfunding and creating new regula-
tions/exemptions specifically for crowdfunding.
Reaffirming applicable regulations has value in itself.287 First, a
governmental publication serves as a notice for individuals already
participating in crowdfunding. Platforms are probably already aware
that they are threading in a heavily regulated environment because
they have lawyers on staff to deal with these regulations; yet, the pub-
lic notice serves as a forewarning about the extent of the regulated
activity and as a notice that they should expect some auditing. In the
case of Australia, ASIC (the regulator) elected to send this guidance
directly to crowdfunding platforms.288
Second, this governmental publication removes some of the doubts
for companies seeking funds through crowdfunding and investors al-
ready investing. Companies and investors, aware of the guidance, are
probably already investing; thus, it may not attract new participants
and funds but it removes some uncertainties.289 When a governmental
affirmation removes doubts about the legal framework, it decreases
the cost of investing.
Third, a governmental affirmation may also attract new funds and
participants. It acknowledges the existence of the practice and also
shines a light on it by creating a story in the newspapers that pub-
licizes crowdfunding. More importantly, it legitimizes the practice be-
cause the government recognizes its existence and the intricate
regulations applying to the practice without prohibiting it. At the Eu-
ropean level, the EC Communication pointed to a plethora of Direc-
tives and Regulations. In itself, it did not alleviate doubts because
each Member State may have applied them differently or it did not
forewarn platforms either because the EC does not regulate on its
own. However, this Communication led to a few news stories in Eu-
rope and publicized the existence of this phenomenon, 290 making peo-
287. See EC Communication, supra note 108, at 8 ("[Tlhe different [Member State] ap-
proaches may create legal uncertainty as to what rules apply to which forms [of crowdfinding],
despite recent initiatives that aim to gather legal information. The public consultation confirmed
the importance of legal clarity for all stakeholders.").
288. ASIC Guidance, supra note 65.
289. For instance, investors and particularly the general public may not have access to the
same legal advice as platforms. They may not realize the implications of investing, including the
risks. An affirmation allows them to look up on their own the applicable regulations without the
assistance of a lawyer.
290. See, e.g., Huw Jones, Pour doper la croissance, la CE veut relancer la titrisation, LES
EcHos (Mar. 24, 2014, 3:39 PM), http://bourse.lesechos.fr/infos-conseils-boursiers/actus-des-
marches/infos.marches/pour-doper-la-croissance-la-ce-veut-relancer-la-titrisatin-96 0 0 3 8 .php
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ple aware that the government was investigating crowdfunding in
further details.291
Faced with crowdfunding, legislators can also decide to create a new
regulation or a new exemption. The United States was the first to
address crowdfunding and may do so again soon. Italy, France, and
the United Kingdom - which are all applying a similar set of Euro-
pean Directives - have nonetheless approached crowdfunding
differently.
All these regulations require that funds be raised through an in-
ternet portal and limit the raise-able funds over a twelve months pe-
riod. Beyond these commonalities, each country focused on a
different participant (i.e. platforms, offering companies, investors).
The United States focuses on the investing crowd and to a smaller
extent on the fundraising companies. It limits the financial participa-
tion of each investor may put into crowdfunding. Platforms, acting as
intermediaries, are regulated under the same registration require-
ments and regulations. The JOBS Act limits the amounts that can be
raised, but more interestingly, the U.S. requires a continuous filing
from these companies with their regulator. These filing costs may de-
ter some small and medium enterprises and impact on equity
crowdfunding.
Italy regulates all three actors but focuses on fund-seeking compa-
nies and the investing crowd. While CONSOB, the Italian regulator,
has implemented a new broker category for online portals and a dif-
ferent compliance procedure, Italian regulation focuses more on the
other two participants. First, it limits the type of companies that may
raise funds, ensuring that crowdfunding provides seed financing for
young innovative companies. Investing in new and innovative compa-
nies involves potentially large none-negligible risks because these
companies lack a track record. To counterbalance this issue, the Italy
regulator, CONSOB, requires the involvement of professional inves-
tors. More projects are posting on these equity crowdfunding web-
sites every day but it is too soon to tell how startups will be affected.
The United Kingdom focused on the investing crowd. The U.K.
regulator, the FCA, elected to allow the average citizen to invest up to
ten percent of his or her net assets by making them "restricted quali-
fied investors." The U.K. regulator however did not address the pro-
(discussing the upcoming communication); Huw Jones, Factbox: EU Roadmap for Expanding
Long-Term Financing, REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2014, 6:34 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/
03/27/us-eu-investment-road-map-factbox-idUSBREA2QOP220140327 (commenting on the past
communication).
291. See, e.g., EC Communication, supra note 108.
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spectus requirement; thus, platforms must still register with the FCA
and use the currently available exemptions (limiting fundraising to C5
million and only 150 non-qualified investors for instances).
France focused on the platforms. The French Ministry of Finance
elected to create a prospectus exemption if the investment is done
through online portal. These online portals have many requirements
including a civil insurance requirement. Companies can raise up to
C1 million and any contributor can participate.
Without further information, it is difficult to understand how each
regulation impact crowdfunding and companies seeking funds. The
next section offers the example that the U.K. regulation has had on
one platform named CrowdCube.
B. Case Study: CrowdCube in 2014
To illustrate some of the points discussed above, I gathered data on
CrowdCube. CrowdCube is among the most successful equity
crowdfunding websites in the U.K. CrowdCube takes advantage of
the prospectus exemption that involve fundraising effort bellow e5
million that involved fewer 150 non-qualified investors and any num-
ber of qualified investors.
I collected data from the CrowdCube website about crowdfunding
campaigns that successfully closed in the calendar year 2014.
CrowdCube does not keep information about unsuccessful campaigns
on their website. Therefore, I focused on successful campaigns.
CrowdCube does not keep information about all successful campaigns
on their website either, which creates a selection bias. In their annual
report, CrowdCube asserts that they funded 105 companies out of 320
projects in 2014 and collected about £35 million.292 I collected infor-
mation about seventy-two companies and who raised seventy-four
percent of these funds.
I eliminated one company because it offered no visible equity (only
rewards) and three companies because they raised money through
bonds instead of equity. Sixty-eight companies, or two-thirds of the
companies that successfully raised fund through CrowdCube in 2014,
remain in the data analysis. The dataset contains the name of the
company, the offering specifics (type of shares, price, amount
targeted, capitalization offered, amount collected, capitalization
granted, number of investors, highest investments), and other infor-
mation about each company. I crossed the collected data with publi-
292. Rose Eliot, Review of 2014, CROWDCuBE BLOG (Jan. 9, 2015), http://
blog.crowdcube.con/2015/01/09/review-of-2014/.
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cally available data about each company from the United Kingdom
government database.2 93 To compare to the active companies distri-
bution, I used business demographic data from the U.K. Office for
National Statistics.294
1. Campaign
Focusing on campaigns, Table 3 presents the characteristics for the
successful crowdfunding equity campaign carried through Crowdcube.
The sixty-eight companies offered on average £191,000 for 12.24% of
equity but raised on average £278,000 for 16.75% of equity. The large
majority of companies allowed for overfunding leading to an average
overfunding: these companies on averaged raised 146% of the initial
capital offered.
TABLE 3. CAMPAIGN CHARACTERISTICS (SOURCE: CROWDCUBE)
Average High Low Standard
Deviation
Capital Offered £190,974 £1,000,000 £35,000 178,757
Capital Raised £278,204 £1,562,960 £45,360 278,716
Capitalization 12.24% 29% 0.39% 6.52
Offered
Capitalization 16.75% 35.07% 1.07% 7.69
Raised
Largest 22.1% 80.2% 6.1% 14.8
Contribution
(function of
total
contribution)
Number of 142 482 19 92
Investors
From a game theory standpoint, this overfunding observation seems
in line with the incentives created by the all-or-nothing model that
CrowdCube employs: an entrepreneur receives the funds only if he
reaches a pre-specified threshold; hence, entrepreneurs are
incentivized to lower the threshold from what they want or need to
what they can reach.
On average, 142 investors invested in each project (with a large
standard deviation). A large portion of the investments comes from a
293. Get Information About a Company, Gov.UK, https://www.gov.uk/get-information-about-
a-company (last visited Mar., 3 2015).
294. Business Demography 2013, OFFICE FOR NATIONAL STATISTIcs, http://www.ons.gov.uk/
ons/rel/bus-register/business-demography/2013/rft-excel-tables.xls (last visited May 26, 2015).
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single large investor: this largest investor provides, on average, 22.1%
of the capital raised. Previous crowdfunding literature discusses that
the first investments often come from friends and family.2 95
Entrepreneurs may receive these large funds from their friends and
family to jumpstart the process.
2. Companies
Focusing on the fund seeking companies, Table 4 presents data
characteristics of the companies. Companies that use crowdfunding
are relatively young: 2.61 year old on average by the time they suc-
cessfully raise funds. The youngest company was a month old (Quiz
the Nation) and the oldest was twelve years old (Bookbarn
International).
TABLE 4. COMPANY CHARACTERISTICS (SOURCE: CROWDCUBE)
Average Maximum Minimum Standard
Deviation
Company Birth November 22, September 9, June 2, 2002
2011 2014
Company Age 2.61 0.10 12.48 2.38
at End of
Campaign
(year)
Number of 0.31 3 0 0.76
Loans
Number of 5 15 1 3
Team Members
Most of these companies have not successfully obtained a loan
since, on average, each company has fewer than one loan.
Furthermore, most of these companies are small: five employees on
average. Therefore, it seems that equity crowdfunding attracts
startups.
A closer look at the company distribution across sectors shows that
12 manufacturing companies, 12 wholesale companies, 39 services
companies, and 5 companies that fall outside these sectors
(construction and farming) successfully raised funds.
This distribution of companies - once excluding construction and
farming sector - almost mirrors the distribution of active companies.
Figure 1 depicts the distribution of companies that were successfully
295. See, e.g., Agrawal et al., supra note 36, at 67.
406 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:359
crowdfunded through CrowdCube in 2014 and compares it to the
population of active companies in the United Kingdom in 2013.
FIGURE 1. COMPARING FUNDED COMPANIES IN 2014 AND ACTIVE
COMPANIES IN THE POPULATION IN 2013 (SOURCE:
CROWDCUBE; OFFICE FOR NATIONAL
STATISTICS)
80.0%
70.0%
60.0%
50.0%
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
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ED Successfully Crowdfunded in 2014 through CrowdCube
0 Active Population in the UK in 2013
This figure shows that successfully funded wholesale companies 296
are relatively close to their ratio of active companies (19.0% versus
19.4%). Funded manufacturing companies are overrepresented
(19.0% versus 6.8%) whereas service companies 297 are under-
represented (61.9% versus 73.8%).
This graph implies that a broad range of companies are successful at
reaching their fundraising threshold - but more particularly manufac-
turing companies. Since campaign must explain how they intend to
profit, it may seem more obvious through manufacturing, which may
have affected investor decisions.
3. Investors and the New Regulation
The 2013 FCA regulation focused on investors. Table 5 shows sum-
mary statistics for investors in these 68 successful companies. The av-
296. Under the UK Standard Industrial Classification of Economic Activities 2007, wholesale
companies include retail companies.
297. Wholesale companies are excluded from service companies because they are represented
independently.
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erage investment increased from £1,559 to £1,985 after the
regulations.298
TABLE 5. INVESTOR PRE- AND POST-APRIL 2014 (SOURCE:
CROWDCUBE)
Number of Capital Investment Investment Investors Overfunding
Total Raised Per Amount Per Amount Per Per
Investments Campaign Investors Investors Investments
Made (without
largest
investment)
Pre-April 1,910 £175,191 £1,559 £1,205 112299 143%
2014
Post-April 8,030 £213,828 £1,985 £1,571 157 146%
2014
The investment per company also increased from about £175,000 to
about £214,000; but the level of overfunding remains essentially the
same. This observation indicates that companies did not alter their
strategy to under-ask to reach the threshold.
The U.K. regulation opened investment to a new set of investors
who did not previously invest. While I cannot obverse where the
funds come from, the regulation seems to have a liberating effect on
the amount invested per person. In turn, the amount raised per
company also increased; this increase may be due to raising more
funds from each individual as well as more investors per campaign.
In other words, clarifying regulations may have legitimized the
crowdfunding practice and seems to have dis-inhibited investment
behavior: per investment, more individual invested (40% increase)
and each investor invested more (around 30% increase). Investors
seem to become more confident. Further research may be able to
identify whether investors in crowdfunding are individuals that did not
invest previously. Interestingly, crowdfunding has also attracted the
attention of traditional investors like venture capital companies. 300
298. The fifth column removes the largest big for each investment because I feared that the
largest big has been put down to encourage investment from friends and family - and not inves-
tors that may be encouraged to invest. The observations remain the same: investment increased
from pre- to post- regulation.
299. It is interesting to note that even before the regulation allowed for the "restricted
qualified investor" category, four out of the seventeen successfully funded projects in 2014 had
over 150 investors, which implies that some of the investors using the platforms had to be
qualified investors.
300. See Samantha Hurst, LOVESPACE Attracts DN Capital During Crowdfunding
Campaign on Crowdcube, Crowdfund Insider (Jun. 5, 2014, 1:46 PM), http://www.crowdfundin
sider.com/2014/06/41142-lovespace-attracts-dn-capital-crowdfunding-campaign-crowdcube/.
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This may be evidence that regulations have legitimized crowdfunding
and encouraged traditional investors to also take advantage of these
opportunities. It remains unclear what the impact will be on the funds
available for investment.
VI. CONCLUSION
In France, Italy, the U.K., and the U.S.,301 companies can now or
will soon be able to raise funds from a large number of individuals.
This may be because the local regulator changed the definition of
qualified investors or created an exemption to the prospectus require-
ments. This plethora of regulations affects all three actors involved in
the crowdfunding process and also where they crowdfund. Countries
may eventually leverage their funding laws and regulations to attract
more startups.
This regulatory arbitrage can work in three ways: platforms may
gravitate toward one country; fund seekers may select to crowdfund
within the country that has the most advantageous regulations; or in-
vestors can invest where most advantages. All three pose a dilemma
for regulators. If an investor voluntarily reaches into another country
to invest and voluntarily takes risks, should she or he enjoy the same
protections or limits as local investors? For instance, a U.S. investor
may decide that France's no limit on investment is more favorable:
what if they invest in France instead of the U.S., should his investment
be limited by the U.S. limits or have no limits like in France?
The same issue goes for companies: if a company voluntarily
reaches aboard to draw more investors, should it be limited by the
local or the foreign investment cap? A lot of those issues are not new
and already have answers but the use of internet portal highlights that
investment may become global and may lead to rethinking these
issues.
301. The discussion in this paper ignores regulations in New Zealand, among others. New
Zealand passed the Financial Market Conduct Act of 2013, which allows companies to raise up
to two million New Zealand dollars over a 12-month period through a licensed platform without
having to issue a prospectus - and without limit on investors aside for acknowledging they un-
derstand the risks involved (akin to the French regulation). See Financial Markets Conduct Act
2013 (N.Z.). Other countries like Canada and Germany have considered their options. For
instance, in March 2014, the Ontario Securities Commission put forth draft rules including an
exemption from the prospectus requirements. Ontario Securities Commission, Introduction of
Proposed Prospectus Exemptions and Proposed Reports of Exempt Distribution in Ontario
(Mar. 2014), available at https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category4/csa 2014
0320_45-106_rfc-prospectus-exemptions.pdf (limiting the contribution per investor and per
project).
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The U.S. states have created a mosaic of regulations but investors
cannot cross state lines. This is not the case for investors in Europe
who may wish to invest across Member States. Investors may how-
ever be taxed several times, which is a different issue beyond the
scope of this Article.
Whether the restricted home or abroad investors will inject enough
funds into the economy to compensate for the fund shortage created
by the financial crisis remains to be seen. As a final thought, the
crowdfunding phenomenon is still in its infancy and the effect of eq-
uity crowdfunding remains unknown. Equity crowdfunding cam-
paigns often raise funds from a few investors, each one contributing
tens of thousands of dollars. We do not know whether these investors
were already investing; if they were, then crowdfunding does not
change the amount of investment funds available but only decreases
the investment costs. More information is needed on whether
crowdfunding affects the direction of the economy. While crowdfund-
ing gives a project a chance with an investing audience, it is unclear
whether investors pick projects in which they would not have invested
otherwise.

